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Abstract
The definition is a common form of human expert knowledge, a building block
of formal science and mathematics, a foundation for database theory and is sup-
ported in various forms in many knowledge representation and formal specification
languages and systems. This paper is a formal study of some of the most common
forms of inductive definitions found in scientific text: monotone inductive defini-
tion, definition by induction over a well-founded order and iterated inductive defi-
nitions. We define a logic of definitions offering a uniform formal syntax to express
definitions of the different sorts, and we define its semantics by a faithful formal-
ization of the induction process. Several fundamental properties of definition by
induction emerge: the non-determinism of the induction process, the confluence of
induction processes, the role of the induction order and its relation to the inductive
rules, how the induction order constrains the induction process and, ultimately, that
the induction order is irrelevant: the defined set does not depend on the induction
order. We propose an inductive construction capable of constructing the defined
set without using the induction order. We investigate borderline definitions of the
sort that appears in definitional paradoxes.
1 Introduction
This paper is a formal scientific study of certain types of definitions as they appear in
mathematical and scientific text. The definition is one of the building blocks of science
and mathematics and its use is ubiquitous there. Consequently, it received due attention
from logicians and computer scientists. Inductive definitions were investigated in meta-
mathematical studies (Moschovakis, 1974a; Aczel, 1977; Feferman, 1970; Martin-Lo¨f,
1971; Buchholz et al., 1981). Definitions play an important role in many declarative
paradigms and systems. In databases (SQL, Datalog), a query is essentially a symbolic
definition of a set that the user wants to be calculated. As such, definitions and de-
finability are key concepts in database theory (Abiteboul et al., 1995). Fixpoint logics
(Gurevich and Shelah, 1985) have their origin in metamathematical studies of induc-
tive definitions and inductive definability. In logic programming, definitions play an
important role as one of the solutions to the problem of explaining the meaning of
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logic programs with negation as failure (Clark, 1978; Schlipf, 1995b; Denecker, 1998).
In knowledge representation, it is widely recognized that definitions are an important
form of human expert knowledge that should be supported in knowledge representation
and specification logics (Brachman et al., 1983; Denecker and Ternovska, 2008, 2007).
Many declarative systems in various fields of computational logic support some form of
definitions, e.g., Minizinc (Nethercote et al., 2007), ProB (Leuschel and Butler, 2008),
IDP (De Cat et al., 2016).
The study in this paper focuses on definitions that are, or can be, formulated as
a set of informal base rules and inductive rules, possibly equipped with an induction
order. This covers the class of non-recursive definitions as a trivial case, but the focus
is on induction, evidently. A prototypical example of a definition of this kind is the
well-known definition of the transitive closure of a graph.
Definition 1.1. The reachability graphR of a directed graph G is defined inductively:
• (d, e) ∈ R if (d, e) ∈ G;
• (d, e) ∈ R if there exists a vertex f such that (d, f), (f, e) ∈ R.
An equally well-known definition is the one of the satisfaction relation of proposi-
tional logic:
Definition 1.2. Given a propositional vocabulary Σ, the satisfaction relation |= be-
tween Σ-structures and Σ-formulas of propositional logic is defined by induction over
the structure of formulas:
• I |= P if P is a propositional symbol and P ∈ I .
• I |= α ∧ β if I |= α and I |= β.
• I |= α ∨ β if I |= α or I |= β (or both).
• I |= ¬α if I 6|= α.
These two definitions are instances of what are probably the two most common
forms of inductive definitions in mathematical and formal scientific text. Definition 1.1
is an example of a monotone inductive definition. Such definitions were studied exten-
sively in mathematical logic (Moschovakis, 1974a; Aczel, 1977). Definition 1.2 is a
definition by structural induction, or by induction on the complexity of the formula. It
is an example of a definition by induction over a well-founded induction order: here
the induction order is the subformula order. Definitions over an induction order may be
non-monotone. For instance, in the fourth rule of Definition 1.2, the condition “I 6|= α”
is a non-monotone condition, in words “it is not the case that I |= α”. This sort of defi-
nition has not been studied so well.1 These two informal definitions are clear instances
of the sort of definitions that we want to study here in this paper and they will serve
as running examples throughout the paper. Our study includes also iterated inductive
definitions, definitions that combine features of monotone induction and induction over
1Some reserve the term inductive definition for what we call here “monotone inductive definitions”, and
recursive definition for what we call “definitions by induction over an induction order”.
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a well-founded order. Such definitions were studied in (Feferman, 1970; Martin-Lo¨f,
1971; Buchholz et al., 1981). They are discussed later in the paper. These are the
forms of definitions that we study here, and we study them from a logical and seman-
tical point of view. It may seem unlikely that about such common and fundamental
objects of mathematical reasoning much remains to be discovered at the semantical
level, and yet we shall argue that this is the case.
Definitions in mathematical or scientific text serve to define formal objects, but
they are not formal objects themselves. As such, we will refer to them as informal def-
initions. Definitions are propositions that state a particular sort of logical relationship:
they define one set (or possibly more than one) in terms of other sets which we call
the parameters of the definition. For instance, the defined set of Definition 1.1 is the
reachability graph R and its unique parameter the graph G; the defined set of Defini-
tion 1.2 is the satisfaction relation between Σ-structures and formulas over Σ and the
parameter is the vocabulary Σ.
Despite their informal nature, inductive definition found in mathematical text strike
us for their precision. The set defined by such an informal definition can often be char-
acterized in two quite different ways: “non-constructively”, as the least set closed under
rule application, and “constructively”, as the set obtained by iterated rule application.
By Tarski’s least fixpoint theorem, both sets coincide.
Tarski’s result, however, holds only for monotone operators. The operator induced
by Definition 1.2 is non-monotone due to its fourth rule, and Tarski’s theorem does
not apply to it: the satisfaction relation |= is not the least relation satisfying the rules
of Definition 1.2. The least relation does not exist; there are infinitely many minimal
sets that are closed under these rules and some are just weird (we return to this in
Example 3.12). While experts are aware of this, this comes as a surprise to many
people, even those skilled in mathematics. This shows that theoretical understanding
of this sort of definition is less widely spread than deserved. What it also shows is that
the constructive principle is the more fundamental of the two principles. We choose
this principle as the foundation of our study. As such, the sort of definition studied
here defines a set by describing how to construct it through an induction process. The
induction process starts from the empty set and proceeds by applying rules until the
set is closed (saturated) under rule application. In case of an induction order, rules
must be applied “along” the specified order. The considered class of definitions covers
non-inductive definitions as a trivial case (no inductive rules) and also the above sorts
of inductive definitions.
Our study is a formal, logical, semantical study of the selected sort of informal
definitions. Syntactically, a formal definition will be defined as a set of formal rules
∀x¯ (P (t¯)← φ)
where P (t¯) is an atomic formula (the definiendum) with P the defined set or relation
and φ is a formula (the definiens) of first-order logic (FO). Given a suitable first-order
vocabulary Σ to express the concepts of the informal definition, we will say that a
formal definition faithfully expresses an informal rule-based definition if there is a one-
to-one correspondence between formal and informal rules such that the definiendum
(i.e., the head) of the rule correctly formalizes the conclusion of the informal rule and
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the definiens (i.e., the body) of the formal rule correctly formalizes that of the informal
rule. For the running example Definition 1.1, the formalization may be as follows:
∆TC =
{
∀x∀y(R(x, y)← G(x, y))
∀x∀y(R(x, y)← ∃z(R(x, z) ∧R(z, y))
}
To formalize Definition 1.2, we use the symbol Sat(i, f) to express that f is a formula
satisfied in structure i, Atom(p) that p is a propositional atom of the vocabulary and
In(p, i) that p is true in structure i, and function symbols And/2, Or/2, Not/1 on
formulas to express connectives (see Example 3.6 in Section 3 for details).
∆|= =


∀i∀p(Sat(i, p) ← Atom(p) ∧ In(p, i))
∀i∀f∀g(Sat(i, And(f, g)) ← Sat(i, f) ∧ Sat(i, g))
∀i∀f∀g(Sat(i, Or(f, g)) ← Sat(i, f) ∨ Sat(i, g))
∀i∀f(Sat(i, Not(f)) ← ¬Sat(i, f))


It can be seen (and it will be shown in a precise mathematical way) that both formal def-
initions faithfully express the corresponding informal deinition. E.g., in ∆|=, the con-
clusion I |= ¬α of the fourth informal rule is correctly translated into Sat(i, Not(f))
and its condition I 6|= α is faithfully translated into the formula ¬Sat(i, f) (where i
stands for I and f for α).
On the semantical level, we will define a model semantics for this formalism. The
key concept in this semantics is the formalization of the induction process. For a formal
definition∆, it will be formalized as an increasing, possibly transfinite sequence of sets
(or, more generally, of structures)
〈A0,A1,A2, . . . 〉
where A0 = ∅ and at each stage i a set of applicable rule instances of ∆ is applied
to obtain Ai+1. The defined set is then the limit of the induction process. A model
of a definition will be defined as a structure in which the interpretation of the defined
symbol is this defined set.
E.g., a small segment of an induction process for Definition 1.2 in the context of
formulas and structures of the vocabulary Σ = {P,Q} is
∅ → {({P,Q}, P ), ({P,Q}, Q)} → {({P,Q}, P∧Q), ({P,Q}, P ), ({P,Q}, Q)} → . . .
It is obtained by applying, first, two instances of the base rule of∆|= to derive satisfac-
tion of P andQ in the structure {P,Q}; second, an instance of the rule for conjunctive
formulas to derive P ∧Q in this same structure.
The above formal notion of the induction process is a faithful formalization of the
iterated rule application that is inherent to the class of informal definitions that we
study here. The concept is a generalization of the formal notion of induction process
found in the standard studies of monotone induction such as by Moschovakis (1974a)
and Aczel (1977). There, the induction process is formalized as the sequence
〈∅,Γ(∅),Γ2(∅), . . . ,Γn(∅), . . . 〉
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obtained by iterating the operator Γ induced by the definition. In the context of the
formalism used here, such an operator driven sequence is a special case of our notion of
induction process obtained by applying at each stage every applicable rule. Our concept
allows for the possibility that at some stage only one or a subset of the applicable rules
is actually applied.
There are three reasons why we base our theory on this more fine-grained notion of
induction process. First, we claim that it is a more faithful formalization of the way hu-
mans actually perform the induction process. E.g., to mentally compute the transitive
closure of a graph from Definition 1.1, we probably do this by individual rule appli-
cations, not by applications of the operator. Second, the more fine grained induction
process is needed to capture the induction process in definitions over an induction or-
der. There, the induction process simply cannot apply all applicable rules at each stage:
only those that respect the induction order can be applied. E.g., in the case of Defini-
tion 1.2, in the initial stage A0 = ∅, every rule instance “I |= ¬ϕ if I 6|= ϕ” applies
(since (I, ϕ) 6∈ ∅) but application of them should be delayed until the induction process
is finished with deriving I |= ϕ. In such cases, an operator-based induction process that
applies all applicable rules at each stage, does not match with informal inductions and
does not construct the defined set. Third, the more fine-grained formalization of the
induction process exposes several fundamental aspects of the studied class of inductive
definitions that, to the best of our knowledge, did not surface in earlier studies.
Perhaps the most striking aspect is the non-determinism of the induction process:
by applying rules in different sequences, many induction processes can be built, even
in the presence of an induction order. Now an all-important issue emerges: do all
induction processes converge to the same set? If not, the definition would be ambigu-
ous! The confluence of different induction processes of informal definitions is a fact
that most of us probably take for granted; however, it is a fundamental and non-trivial
property of induction. This is one of the topics that will be analyzed in this paper.
Also other aspects emerge from our study. E.g., how the induction order constrains
the induction process, what the link is between the induction order and the rules, or
the surprising fact that the set defined by a definition over an induction order does not
depend on that order.
In the next section, we discuss the scope of the work of this paper, its limitations
and contributions and we situate it in the broader context of mathematical and compu-
tational logic and of knowledge representation.
2 Scope of the study and related work
Related work
(Informal) definitions, including inductive ones, are fundamental in building mathe-
matics and consequently, they have been a prime topic of research in the field of meta-
mathematics (the mathematical study of mathematical methods). The logical study of
monotone induction was started by Post (1943) and was continued in many later stud-
ies (Spector, 1961; Moschovakis, 1974a; Aczel, 1977). The study of iterated induction
(which generalizes monotone induction and induction over a well-founded order) was
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started by Kreisel (1963) and extended in later studies of so-called Iterated Inductive
Definitions (IID) by Feferman (1970), Martin-Lo¨f (1971), and Buchholz et al. (1981).
Common to all these studies is that they focus on formal expressivity results, formal ac-
counts of what classes of objects can be defined. In the words of Hallna¨s (1991), these
studies were primarily concerned with inductive definability, more than with inductive
definitions.
The perspective of this paper is different. The focus is on the semantical properties
of sorts of definitions that have not been fully analysed yet from a semantical point of
view: definitions over an induction order and iterated inductive definitions. Our study
departs from earlier studies by using a different formalization of the induction process.
As a consequence, novel aspects of informal definitions emerge that were not formally
studied before.
A formal “empirical” scientific study
Informal definitions exist. They appear in mathematical and scientific text. They are
written, read, broadly understood, reasoned upon and computed with. Definitions are
the “reality” that we study here. They are not tangible, physical objects. They are of
cognitive nature and we can express and “sense” them only via language. Nevertheless,
they are of mathematical, objective precision and this makes them suitable for formal
scientific research.
A definition is not a physical reality, and as such some will argue that this study
cannot be called an “empirical” scientific study. Nevertheless, our study shares many
properties with empirical formal science. Most importantly, the theory is falsifiable.
Any well structured informal definition of the studied class (e.g., Definitions 1.1 and
1.2) presents a potential experiment. To “execute” the experiment, one needs to es-
tablish a correspondence between the mathematical objects involved in the informal
definition (parameters and potential defined sets) and structures of the vocabulary of
the formal definition; then one needs to verify that the formal definition faithfully ex-
presses an informal definition, in the sense defined in the introduction, then compare
the mathematical object defined by the informal definition with the one defined by the
formal definition. If a difference is found, the experiment refutes the theory; otherwise
it confirms (corroborates) it.
In empirical sciences, there is a fundamental asymmetry between proving and dis-
proving a theory. No number of successful experiments suffices to prove an empirical
theory; but one failed experiment suffices to disprove it (Popper, 1959). Likewise, we
cannot “prove” that our mathematical theory of informal definitions is correct. After
all, there is no mathematical definition of what is an informal definition. Nevertheless,
we are confident of our theory. In the first place, the semantic principle of the informal
definitions under investigation is a solid intuition, and easy to formalize. While this is
not a proof of our theory, it certainly is a compelling argument in favour for it. In the
second place, contrary to physical science, any “experiment” in a study like this one
is a mathematical problem. The correspondence between the mathematical objects of
the informal definition and the structures of the formal definition, the question whether
the formal definition faithfully expresses an informal definition and the correspondence
between the informally defined object and the formally defined structure: they can be
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analysed with mathematical methods and precision.
As such, it might be easier for us to convince the reader of the correctness of our
theory than it is for a physicist to argue the correctness of a set of mathematical postu-
lates about some physical reality. The cognitive nature of the studied objects does not
prevent a precise mathematical approach to it.
Limits of the scope of the study
The scope of our study is limited in several respects. We sum up and discuss some
limitations.
Many definitions in scientific and mathematical text define (partial) functions. The
standard inductive definitions of the Fibonacci numbers and factorials, and of the truth
evaluation function of propositional and predicate logic are examples. Most inductive
definitions of functions are definitions over a well-founded order. Hallna¨s (1991) de-
fines and investigates a logic of inductive definitions of (partial) functions. In contrast,
the logic that we define in this paper is to define sets.
Sets are Boolean functions and vice versa, functions are particular sets. It would not
be difficult to extend our definition logic to define functions. But for now, to express
definitions of n-ary (partial) functions F/n, they need to be translated to definitions
of their n+1-ary graphs. Such transformations are routine in logic and mathematics.
We see no essential difference between a definition of a function and the definition of
its graph. As such, we believe that our study covers function definitions. Later this
section, a small example is worked out.
The definition formalism introduced here is built on first order logic (FO): it serves
to define FO predicates and the definiens of a definitional rule is a FO-formula. This is
for simplicity only. In fact, all concepts in Section 3, 4, and 5 and many of them later
are defined semantically in terms of the satisfaction relation of FO, and their defini-
tions readily extend to extensions of FO equipped with a satisfaction relation (e.g., to
higher-order logic, aggregate expressions, . . . ). Later in this section, such an example
is worked out.
As a third limitation, our study covers non-inductive definitions, monotone defini-
tions, definitions over an induction order and iterated inductive definitions. These are
likely the most frequent types of definitions found in mathematical text and knowledge
representation but there are other types of definitions. Not all informal definitions use
the inductive constructions that we study here. Some definitions might define math-
ematical objects by a specific construction process expressed in the definition. Some
types of definitions use a different type of induction process. Examples are inflation-
ary induction (Moschovakis, 1974b; Gurevich and Shelah, 1985) (discussed in Section
3) and nested induction/coinduction (Sangiorgi, 2009). The latter principle is imple-
mented in logics with nested least fixpoints such as FO(LFP) (Gurevich and Shelah,
1985), µ-calculus (Kozen, 1983) and fixpoint logics with nested least and greatest fix-
points (Bradfield, 1996; Hou, 2010).
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Definitional paradoxes
One failed experiment suffices to refute a formal scientific theory but a refuted theory
is not necessarily useless. E.g., Newtonian physics was soundly refuted, but it is still by
far the most used physics theory. Many useful formal scientific theories are known to
be only approximations of reality and to fail on borderline cases. This is not necessarily
an argument to reject a theory, but rather a challenge to develop an understanding of
where the theory is sufficiently precise and where are the borderline cases where it
becomes unreliable.
Such phenomena will arise also in our theory. In particular, not every informal
rule set constitutes a sensible informal definition. Some certainly do while others cer-
tainly don’t. Where there is white and black, there is often also grey, and there is a
grey zone between sensible and insensible definitions. We will argue that some quite
famous “definitions” that emerged in philosophy belong to this grey or black zone: the
definitional paradoxes.2
The informal semantics of connectives
The definition logic defined here is built on classical logic FO. Connectives and quan-
tifiers in formal rule bodies are those of FO and they retain the informal interpretation
they have in FO:
• The methodology of expressing informal rules is based on the standard interpre-
tation of the FO connectives and quantifiers.
• The evaluation of rules during the induction process is based on standard FO
semantics.
Specifically, the meaning of the negation connective in definitional rules is standard
objective negation, like negation in FO.
The only truly non-standard connective in the formalism is the rule operator←. A
rule describes a step in the induction process, a step that produces a defined fact. As
such, rules of a definition were called productions by Martin-Lo¨f (1971). Rules are not
truth functional; it does not even make sense to consider them as propositions (that can
be true or false).
More examples
Below, a few additional informal definitions (experiments) are specified that belong to
the class of definitions that we study here.
The linguistic style of expressing informal definitions as sets of cases also applies
to non-recursive definitions. The definition below defines the symmetric closure SG of
2One aspect in which a formal study of inductive definitions is different than an empirical science is in the
analysis of border cases of the system. In physics, Einstein discovered black holes by extrapolating relativity
theory to its border cases; it turned out that these objects that had never been observed actually existed. But,
in a formal study of a cognitive “reality” like ours, extrapolating the formalism to cases beyond what is found
in scientific and mathematical text, ends up in the void: there is nothing there.
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a graphG with two cases:{
∀x∀y(SG(x, y)← G(x, y))
∀x∀y(SG(x, y)← G(y, x))
}
A second example is in the context of the stock market. A company A controls
a company B if the sum of the shares in B possessed by A or by any other company
controlled by A, is more than 50%. To express this inductive definition, we use the sum
aggregate over set expressions.{
∀a∀b(Contr(a, b)← Sum({(x, c) | Shares(c, b, x) ∧ (c = a ∨Contr(a, c))}) > 0.5)
}
Here, Contr(a, b) has the obvious meaning that a controls b; Shares(c, b, x) means
that c has x shares in b. The value of a sum term Sum({(x, y) | ϕ}) in structure A is
defined as ∑
{(d,d′)|A[x:d;y:d′]|=ϕ}
d
The example definition is a monotone definition according to Definition 3.16 intro-
duced later. It faithfully expresses the informal definition.
For a next example, the context is a (finite) transition structure 〈S,→〉 with set of
states S and transition graph→. We call a state s ∈ S terminating if no infinite path
s→ s1 → s2 → . . . in the transition graph exists. This concept can be defined through
the following inductive definition.
Definition 2.1. A state s ∈ S is terminating if for each transition s→ y, y is terminat-
ing.
The base case of this definition is any state xwithout outgoing edge. This monotone
inductive definition involves a universal quantifier in the definiens. Using symbolG/2
to express the graph and Term/1 to express the set of terminating states, the faithful
translation of the definition in our formalism is:{
∀x(Term(x)← ∀y(G(x, y)⇒ Term(y)))
}
As a second example, we define the rank of a terminating state s as the length of
the longest path s → s1 → . . . → sn through the transition graph. This is a partial
function defined on terminating states. It can be defined inductively, over the induction
order ≺ that is the transitive closure ←∗ of the inverse relation of →. On the set of
terminating states, ≺ is a strict well-founded order relation.
Definition 2.2. We define the rank of terminating states of S by induction on ≺:
• The rank of a terminating state s ∈ L is the least strict upperbound of the ranks
of its successors in G.
This is an informal definition of a partial function (since the rank of non-terminating
states is not defined). We define the graph of the rank function in a typed variant of the
definition logic:

∀x∀r(Rank(x, r) ← Term(x)∧
∀y∀r1(G(x, y) ∧Rank(y, r1)⇒ r > r1)∧
∀r2(∀y∀r1(G(x, y) ∧Rank(y, r1)⇒ r2 > r1)⇒ r ≤ r2))


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The definiens has three conditions: that x is terminating, that r is strictly larger than the
rank r1 of any successor y of x, and thirdly, that if r2 is strictly larger than the rank of
any successor of x, then r is smaller than r2. Hence, this definition faithfully expresses
the informal definition.
This is a non-monotone definition, due to the negative occurrence of Rank in the
middle condition. The induction process builds up Rank starting from the minimal
elements of≺ (states without outgoing edges) for which the rank is defined to be 0 (the
smallest number), and then gradually for other terminal ranks further away from these
base cases. The role of the induction order is essential to obtain a correct induction
proces. E.g., in the initial state of the induction process, when Rank is still empty,
the three conditions of the rule hold for the variable assignment {x = s, r = 0} with
s a terminating state. So untimely application of such a rule instance would derive
Rank(s) = 0 for any terminating state s.
In the extension of FO with a minimum aggregate, the definition can be stated
equivalently as:{
∀x∀r(Rank(x, r) ← Term(x)∧
r =Minimum({r1 + 1 | ∃y(G(x, y) ∧Rank(y, r1))}))
}
In a suitable extension of the definition logic, the body of this rule would be equivalent
with the FO body above and hence, in the theory defined below, these two formal
definitions of Rank would have the same semantical properties: the same induction
order, the same induction processes and they define the same set.
Later in this paper, one more example of an informal definition will be given, an
iterated inductive definition with mixed monotone and ordered induction.
3 Formal definitions and natural inductions
Preliminaries
We introduce the concepts and notations of syntax and semantics of first order logic.
We assume an infinite supply of symbols. A symbol is either an object symbol, a
predicate symbol or a function symbol. Predicate and function symbols have a unique
arity n, denoting the number of arguments. Object symbols correspond to function
symbols of arity 0.
The logical symbols are t (true), f (false), the binary equality predicate=, connec-
tives ∧,∨,¬ and the quantifiers ∃, ∀. Other symbols are called non-logical.
A vocabulary Σ is a set of non-logical symbols.
A term is built as usual: an object symbol is a term; if t1, . . . , tn are terms and
f an n-ary function, then f(t1, . . . , tn) is a term. Atomic formulas or atoms are ex-
pressions of the form P (t1, . . . , tn) with P an n-ary predicate symbol and t1, . . . , tn
terms. Formulas are built from atomic formulas and the logical symbols in the usual
way: atoms are formulas, and if x is an object symbol and ϕ, ψ are formulas, then
¬ϕ, ϕ∧ψ, ϕ∨ψ, ∀x ϕ, ∃x ϕ are formulas. Terms and formulas are called expressions.
An occurrence of a symbol τ in an expression ϕ is free if τ does not occur in a
subformula ∃τψ or ∀τψ of ϕ. The set free(ϕ) is the set of all symbols that have a free
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occurrence in ϕ. A sentence over Σ is a formula ϕ with free(ϕ) ⊆ Σ.
An occurrence of a subformula ϕ in ψ is called positive if it occurs in the scope of
an even number of negations, otherwise it is called negative. A formula ϕ is positive
with respect to a set σ of predicate symbols if there are no atoms P (t¯) with P ∈ σ that
have a negative occurrence in ϕ.
Definition 3.1. A structure A of vocabulary Σ consist of a non-empty set DA called
the domain of A and an assignment of a value τA to symbols τ ∈ Σ, called the inter-
pretation of τ in A. The value τA is an element of DA if τ is an object symbol, an
n-ary relation overDA if τ is an n-ary predicate symbol, and an n-ary function onDA
if τ is an n-ary function symbol. The interpretation of= is the identity relation onDA.
A structure A of Σ is often called a Σ-structure.
The restriction of a Σ-structure A to some vocabulary Σ′ ⊆ Σ is denoted A|Σ′ .
While the value PA of a predicate symbol is a set of n-tuples, we sometimes use it
as a Boolean function, more specifically as its characteristic function. For an n-tuple a¯
of domain elements, PA(a¯) denotes t if a¯ ∈ PA, and f otherwise.
Definition 3.2. We define the truth evaluation function of FO by structural induction,
extendingA to arbitrary terms and sentences overΣ using the standard inductive rules:
• f(t1, . . . , tn)A = fA(t1A, . . . , tnA);
• P (t1, . . . , tn)A = PA(t1A, . . . , tnA);
• (¬ϕ)A = ¬(ϕA),
• (ϕ ∧ ψ)A = ϕA ∧ ψA,
• (ϕ∨ψ)A = ϕA∨ψA, with¬,∧,∨ representing the standard boolean functions;
• (∀xϕ)A = minimum≤t{ϕ
A[x:d] | d ∈ DA}, where A[x : d] is the structure
identical to A except that xA = d and ≤t is the truth order defined by f <t t;
• (∃xϕ)A = maximum≤t{ϕ
A[x:d] | d ∈ DA}.
Let D be a non-empty set. A domain atom of D is a pair (P, a¯) with P/n a
predicate symbol and a¯ ∈ Dn. Abusing notation, we write domain atoms as atoms
P (a¯), Q(b¯). We use A,B,C as mathematical variables for domain atoms. A domain
literal is a domain atom A or its negation ¬A. Domain literals are denoted as L,L′.
Given a structure A with domain D, we define P (a¯)A = PA(a¯). For a given set σ of
predicate symbols, we denote the set of domain atoms with predicates in σ by AtσD.
For two structures A,B interpreting the same vocabulary, with the same domain
and interpretation of all object and function symbols, we write A≤tB if for every
domain atom A, AA≤tAB.
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Formalization of informal definitions: syntax and the induction pro-
cess
In this section, we formalize the syntax of the logic, when rules apply, when a definition
is saturated and the induction process.
Definition 3.3. A (formal) definition over Σ is a set of definition rules of the form
∀x¯ (P (t¯)← φ)
where φ is a FO formula and P (t¯) is an atomic formula over Σ such that P is not the
equality predicate=.
We callP (t¯) the head of the rule or the definiendum, and φ the body or the definiens.
The connective← is called definitional implication. It should be distinguished from
material implication. Note that this formal notion of definition does not (yet) include
an induction order.
A predicate appearing in the head of a rule of a definition ∆ is called a defined
predicate of∆; all other non-logical symbols with free occurrences in ∆ are called its
parameters. The sets of defined predicates and parameters of∆ are denoted by def (∆)
and pars(∆), respectively. Below, a domain atom P (a¯) of a defined predicate of ∆ is
called a defined domain atom. For simplicity, we assume that every rule is of the form
∀x¯ (P (x¯) ← φ) where x¯ is a tuple of distinct variables. Other rules ∀x¯ (P (t¯) ← φ)
are seen as shorthands for ∀y¯ (P (y¯)← ∃x¯(y¯ = t¯ ∧ φ)).
An informal rule-based definition is formally represented by choosing a suitable
vocabulary Σ, and translating its informal rules rule by rule with heads representing
the definiendum and bodies expressing the definiens of the informal rule. The formal
definitions ∆|= and ∆TC were obtained this way from Definition 1.2, respectively
Definition 1.1.
We will define the set defined by such formal definitions by formalizing the induc-
tion process as we discussed it above: the construction process proceeds by iterated
rule application (along an induction order if there is one). As such, rules in this for-
malism are similar in nature to and generalize productions as defined by Martin-Lo¨f
(1971).
To formally define the induction process, a few auxiliary concepts are needed. First,
an informal definition is always evaluated in a context of specific values for the param-
eters. Likewise, a formal definition is always evaluated in a context structure, which
provides values for the parameter symbols.
Definition 3.4. We call a pars(∆)-structure O a context structure of∆.
Given a def (∆)-structure A and a context structure O with the same domain as A,
we write O ◦A to denote the structureB such thatB|pars(∆) = O andB|def (∆) = A.
The following examples expose the context structures underlying the formal def-
initions ∆TC and ∆|=. At the same time, we verify that these definitions faithfully
express the corresponding informal definitions.
Example 3.5. The context structureO for defining the reachability relation of graph G
on the set of vertices V , has domain V andGO = G.
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Combinations of graphs G and R on some domain V correspond one-to-one to Σ-
structures with domain V , GA = G and RA = R. Under this correspondence, we can
verify that∆TC faithfully expresses Definition 1.1. E.g., for the inductive rule, we need
to verify that in the context of arbitrary graphsG andR on domainV and corresponding
A, that for every pair d, e ∈ V , (d, e) ∈ R if and only if A[x : d][y : e] |= R(x, y) and
that there exists a vertex f such that (d, f), (f, e) ∈ R if and only if
A[x : d][y : e] |= ∃z(R(x, z) ∧R(z, y)).
This follows straight from the formal definition of FO’s satisfaction relation. A similar
argument holds for the base rule. Thus,∆TC faithfully expresses Definition 1.1. N
Example 3.6. The definition∆|= of Sat formalizes the informal Definition 1.2 of sat-
isfaction. Its parameter symbols are Atom, In,And,Or and Not. We view ∆|= as a
many-sorted definition, with one sort for structures and another for formulas. For any
propositional vocabulary ξ, we define PropF (ξ) as the set of propositional formulas
over ξ and Struct(ξ) as the set of propositional ξ-structures. A propositional vocabu-
lary ξ induces the context structureO which is the sorted pars(∆)-structure defined as
follows:
• DO consists of two sort domains PropF (ξ) and Struct(ξ).
• AndO is the function that maps pairs of formulas (ψ, φ) to the formula ψ ∧ φ.
The functionsOrO andNotO are defined in a similar vein.
• Finally, InO is {(I, p) | I ∈ Struct(ξ), p ∈ I}.
As an example, two defined domain atoms for ξ = {P} areSat({P}, P ) andSat({}, P∧
¬P ). The value tO of the term t = And(P,Not(P )) is the formula P ∧ ¬P .
Given O, there is an obvious correspondence between binary relations between
structures and formulas of ξ and def (∆|=)-structures. Given this correspondence, it is
a simple exercise to prove that the formal rules of∆|= are faithful formalisations of the
corresponding informal rules. Hence,∆|= faithfully expresses Definition 1.2.
N
From here till the end of this section, we assume the presence of a definition ∆
and a context structure O for ∆ with domainD. In the sequel, we frequently evaluate
formulas with respect to structures O ◦ A. Because O is given and fixed, we take the
liberty to write only the “variable” part and write, e.g., A |= ϕ instead of O ◦ A |= ϕ,
or AA instead of AO◦A, etcetera.
The next definitions are formalizations of the concept of an element being derivable
from a definition, and a set being closed or saturated under a definition.
Definition 3.7. We say that a defined domain atomP (a¯) is derivable by rule ∀x¯(P (x¯)←
ϕ) from A if ϕA[x¯:a¯] = t.
We say that P (a¯) is derivable from A (by ∆) if it is derivable by a rule of ∆ from
A. Below, we denote this by A ⊢∆ P (a¯).
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Definition 3.8. We say that A is closed (or saturated) on a set S of defined domain
atoms (under∆ in O) if for every A ∈ S, A ⊢∆ A implies AA = t. We say that A is
closed (or saturated) (under∆ in O) if it is closed on At
def (∆)
D (under∆ in O).
We observe that the set of def (∆)-structures with domain DO is isomorphic with
the powerset of At
def (∆)
D , where the isomorphism maps such a structure A to the set
{A ∈ At
def (∆)
D | A
A = t}. Under this isomorphism, the ≤t-least structure corre-
sponds to the empty set, and the truth order≤t on structures corresponds to the subset
relation ⊆. We find it convenient to exploit this isomorphism to apply standard set
theoretic operations on def (∆)-structures; e.g., denoting structures as sets of defined
domain atoms, writing A ∈ A instead of AA = t, or A \A′ to denote the structure that
interprets each predicate symbol P ∈ def (∆) as PA \ PA
′
.
The following examples are the simplest sensible non-monotone definitions that we
know of. They will be used as running examples through this text.
Example 3.9. Let us take the instance of Definition 1.2 of propositional satisfaction
obtained by fixing ξ = {P}, by fixing the structure I to be {P}, and by limiting
the formulas to those that use only the negation symbol. That is, the formulas are
P,¬P,¬¬P, . . . , (¬)nP, . . . . This instantiates the definition to
• {P} |= P
• {P} |= ¬ϕ if {P} 6|= ϕ.
Obviously, the formulas defined to be true here are of the form (¬)2nP with an even
number of negations. N
The above definition is further simplified by transposing it to the natural numbers.
Definition 3.10. The set of even numbers is defined by induction on the standard order
of natural numbers:
• 0 is even;
• n+1 is even if n is not even.
Note the correspondence with Example 3.9. This is not a common way of defining
even numbers (there are much simpler ways) but it is a sensible way nevertheless.
Example 3.11. Definition 3.10 is faithfully expressed in the definition formalism as
follows:
∆ev =
{
Even(0)← t
∀x(Even(x+ 1)← ¬Even(x))
}
(1)
The context structure denoted Oev is the structure of the natural numbers, with the
standard interpretation of 0, 1 and +. N
In the following example, it is demonstrated that the non-constructive characterisa-
tion of the defined set of an inductive definition, as the least set closed under application
of the rules, does not work for non-monotone definitions.
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Example 3.12. Let us verify that the non-constructive characterisation of the defined
set of a definition does not work for∆ev . Consider the following sets (for succinctness,
we abbreviate Even to Ev):
{Ev(0), Ev(2), Ev(4), . . . }
{Ev(0), Ev(1), Ev(3), . . . }
{Ev(0), Ev(2), Ev(3), Ev(5), . . . }
. . .
{Ev(0), Ev(2), . . . , Ev(2n), Ev(2n+1), Ev(2n+3), . . . }
. . .
Each of these sets represents a structure closed under∆ev . None has a strict subset that
is closed under ∆ev , hence each of them is minimal. Consequently, there is no least
closed set. Thus, the defined set of this definition is not the least set closed under the
rules. A similar phenomenon arises for the satisfaction Definition 1.2. N
Now we formalize the main concept of this paper: the induction process.
Definition 3.13. A natural inductionN of∆ inO (with domainD) is a≤t-increasing
sequence (Aα)0≤α≤β of def (∆)-structures with domainD such that:
• A0 is the empty structure ∅.
• For each successor ordinal i + 1 ≤ β, for each domain atom A ∈ Ai+1 \ Ai, A
is derivable from ∆ in Ai (Ai ⊢∆ A). We say that A is derived at i and define
‖A‖N := i, the stage of A in N .
• For each limit ordinal λ ≤ β, Aλ =
⋃
α<λAα.
We call β the length ofN , and denote Aβ as lim(N ).
Definition 3.14. A natural induction is called terminal if Aβ is closed under∆ (inO).
Natural inductions will be denoted compactly as a sequence of the (disjoint) sets of
atoms that are derived at each step. For instance,
→ {A1, . . . , An} → {B1, . . . , Bm} → . . .
derives the Ai’s in step 1 and the Bj’s in step 2. If such a set is a singleton we drop the
brackets.
Example 3.15. Consider the formal definition ∆TC formalizing the transitive clo-
sure Definition 1.1. Take context structure O such that DO = {a, b, c}, GO =
{(a, a), (b, c), (c, b)}. All terminal natural inductions converge to {(a, a), (b, c), (c, b), (b, b), (c, c)}.
For instance, the following are three different natural inductions that converge to this
set:
→ T (a, a)→ T (b, c)→ T (c, b)→ T (b, b)→ T (c, c)
→ {T (c, b), T (b, c)} → T (c, c)→ T (b, b)→ T (a, a)
→ {T (a, a), T (b, c), T (c, b)} → {T (c, c), T (b, b)}
The third one is the most eager induction in the sense that it applies at each stage every
applicable rule. Such a natural induction corresponds to the fixpoint computation of
the operator associated with ∆TC . This operator will be defined below. N
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We want to link natural inductions of monotone definitions with the more standard
operator-based formalization of the induction process.
Definition 3.16. We call∆monotone inO if for all pairs of def (∆)-structuresA ⊆ B,
for all defined domain atoms A, if A ⊢∆ A thenB ⊢∆ A.
We now show that the concept of natural induction generalizes the existing operator-
based formalizations of the induction process used, e.g., by Moschovakis (1974a) and
Aczel (1977). Translated to our context, the induction process for a (monotone) def-
inition ∆ in O is formalized as the (possibly transfinite) least fixpoint construction
∅,Γ(∅),Γ2(∅), . . . of the (monotone) operator Γ associated with∆ in O.
Definition 3.17. The operatorΓO∆ of∆ in contextO is the operator of def (∆)-structures
with domainDO such that ΓO∆(A) = {A ∈ At
def (∆)
D | A ⊢∆ A}.
Clearly,∆ is monotone in O if and only if ΓO∆ is a monotone operator.
The least fixpoint construction of this operator is the (potentially transfinite) se-
quence:
〈Aα〉0≤α≤β
where A0 = ∅,Aα+1 = ΓO∆(Aα), Aλ = ∪α<λAα for limit ordinals λ, and Aβ is a
fixpoint of ΓO∆.
It follows from Tarski’s least fixpoint theorem that if ΓO∆ is monotone, this sequence
is monotonically increasing and converges to the least fixpoint of ΓO∆. It is obvious
as well that in this case, the least fixpoint construction is a special case of a natural
induction; in particular, it is the most eager natural induction, the one in which a defined
domain atom is derived as soon as it is derivable.
Corollary 3.18. If ∆ is monotone in O, the least fixpoint construction of ΓO∆ is a
natural induction.
An example of a monotone definition is the running example∆TC from Section 1.
It is a positive definition, one in which every occurrence of a defined predicate in a rule
body is positive. Positive definitions are monotone in every context structure.
Example 3.19. A monotone definition need not be positive. Three such definitions are
{P ← P ∨ ¬P} and {P ← P ∧ ¬P} and {P ← Q ∨ (Q ∧ ¬P )}. N
It follows fromCorollary 3.18 that the concept of a natural induction generalizes the
least fixpoint construction. However, while the least fixpoint construction is a unique
construction, a striking property of natural inductions is that that they are highly non-
deterministic: rules can be applied in many orders, each order yielding a different natu-
ral induction. This matches our intuitive understanding that for an informal definition,
there are in general many ways to construct the defined set. This is often advantageous,
e.g., it allows us to pick the induction process that suits best our needs. However, there
is a danger as well. From a practical point of view, it is all-important that different
induction sequences converge to the same fixpoint, otherwise the definition would be
ambiguous!
For a monotone informal definition such as Definition 1.1, the order of rule appli-
cation is not important, because all sequences converge to the intended set, which is the
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least relation that is closed under the rules. In the above framework of natural induction
sequences, this can be proven formally.
Proposition 3.20. Each terminal natural induction of a monotone definition ∆ in O
converges to the least def (∆)-structure A that is closed under∆ in O.
This proposition is not difficult to prove but also follows from the general Theo-
rem 3.50 below.
When the operator ΓO∆ is not monotone, the least fixpoint construction of its opera-
tor may not converge. For such operators, Moschovakis (1974b) defined the inflation-
ary fixpoint constructionwhich is defined similarly except that Aα+1 = Aα∪ΓO∆(Aα).
Hence, once a defined domain atom is derived, it remains derived. Consequently, the
inflationary construction yields a monotonically increasing sequence and eventually
reaches a limit, called the inflationary fixpoint. For monotone operators, this construc-
tion coincides with the standard one, and the inflationary fixpoint is the least fixpoint.
Again, it is obvious that the inflationary fixpoint construction is the most eager
natural induction of∆ inO, the one that derives a defined domain atom as soon as it is
derivable.
Corollary 3.21. For every definition ∆ and context structure O, the inflationary fix-
point construction of ΓO∆ is a natural induction.
However, the convergence property does not hold for non-monotone definitions. In
general, many natural inductions converge to different sets. The problem is that the
body of a non-monotone rule may eventually become false, after it has already been
true. Natural inductions that apply a rule during the “window” where its body holds
will derive its head, whereas natural inductions that miss this window may not.
Example 3.22 (Continuation of Example 3.11). Consider definition∆ev in the context
structureOev of the natural numbers. The following is a natural induction:
→ Ev(1)→ Ev(0)→ Ev(3)→ Ev(5)→ Ev(7)→ . . .
Indeed, in the first step when A0 = ∅, all instances of the rule for Ev(x + 1) are
applicable. Here, we use it to derive Ev(1). The next step applies the base rule to
derive Ev(0), which falsifies the condition of the rule that was applied in the first
step. Next, we derive Ev(3), Ev(5), . . .. The limit of this natural induction is one
of the unintended minimal closed sets from Example 3.12. The inflationary fixpoint
construction is the terminal natural induction that converges in one step and derives
evenness of all numbers:
→ {Ev(n) | n ∈ N}
N
Example 3.23 (Continuation of Example 3.6). Consider the informal Definition 1.2
and its formalization ∆|= in the context structure of the structure O for the singleton
vocabulary ξ = {P}. There are only two structures for the vocabulary ξ, namely, ∅ and
{P}. Below is an initial segment of a natural induction that derives an erroneous fact.
→ Sat({P},¬P )→ Sat({P}, P )→ . . .
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In the first step, with A0 = ∅, all instances of the rule for negation are applicable.
Here, we use it to derive Sat({P},¬P ). However, the next step applies the base rule
to derive Sat({P}, P ), thus falsifying the condition of the rule that was applied in the
first step.
Likewise, the first step of the inflationary fixpoint construction derives all domain
atoms Sat(I,¬ϕ), many of which are erroneous. This natural induction violates the
induction order of Definition 1.2 and is not one of its intended induction processes. N
The above discussion illuminates what, in our opinion, is the essential role of the
induction order in informal definitions. In definitions by induction over an induction
order, the induction order serves to constrain the induction processes to ensure conver-
gence. It does so by delaying the application of rules until it is safe to do so, that is,
until later rule applications can no longer falsify the premise of a rule that has been
applied before.
Formalization of definitions by induction over a well-founded order
We now formally define the notion of definition by induction over a well-founded order
and its natural inductions.
In particular, in a context O, we are interested in pairs (∆,≺) with ∆ a defini-
tion and ≺ a strict well-founded order on At
def (∆)
D , referred to as the induction order.
Recall that a strict order is irreflexive, transitive and asymmetric. A strict order ≺ is
well-founded if it has no infinite descending chains x0 ≻ x1 ≻ x2 ≻ . . . .
The following example illustrates how to formalize the induction order of an infor-
mal definition.
Example 3.24. The induction order of Definition 3.10 of even numbers is the standard
order on the natural numbers. Its formalization is the order {Ev(n) ≺ Ev(m) | n <
m}. We denote it as ≺ev. N
Example 3.25. Let us consider informal Definition 1.2 and its formalization, the for-
mal definition∆|= in context structureO for a selected propositional vocabulary ξ.
The induction order of informal Definition 1.2 is the subformula order. The first
formalization of this order that comes to mind is the strict well-founded order ≺ on
domain atoms defined by Sat(I, ψ) ≺ Sat(J, φ) if ψ is a strict subformula of φ.
According to this order, to derive satisfaction of a formula in J , one first needs to
determine the satisfaction of its subformulas in each and every structure I . Clearly, it
suffices to determine their satisfaction in the structure J . This effect can be obtained by
refining the induction order such that Sat(I, ψ) ≺ Sat(J, φ) if I = J and ψ is a strict
subformula of φ. We call this the formal subformula order and denote it as ≺|=. N
The induction order provided with an informal definition serves to constrain the
order of rule application in natural inductions. How does this work? Intuition says
that no rule should be applied to derive a fact as long as there are derivable but not yet
derived facts that are strictly smaller in the induction order. For instance, assume that
at some point in the induction process I |= ϕ is derivable. We are allowed to make this
derivation only if there is no strict subformula ψ of ϕ for which I |= ψ is derivable but
was not yet derived.
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Thus, an atom P (a¯) can be derived in the current set Ai only if all strictly smaller
derivable atoms in the induction order have been derived. Formally, if Ai is saturated
on the set {B | B ≺ A}. This is expressed in the following definition. (Recall that the
stage ‖A‖N of A in a natural inductionN is the ordinal i such that A ∈ Ai+1 \ Ai.)
Definition 3.26. A natural inductionN respects ≺ (w.r.t. ∆ andO) if for any domain
atom A derived at stage i, every atom B ≺ A that is derivable from Ai is true in Ai;
equivalently, if Ai is saturated on {B | B ≺ A} (under∆ in O).
We would expect that a natural induction that respects ≺ also derives atoms in this
order.
Definition 3.27. We say thatN follows ≺ if for every A and B derived byN , A ≺ B
implies ‖A‖N < ‖B‖N .
Example 3.28. The natural induction of Example 3.23:
→ Sat({P},¬P )→ Sat({P}, P )→ . . .
does not respect the formal subformula order≺|=. The atom Sat({P},¬P ) is derived
in the first step, but Sat({P}, P ) is lower in the induction order and is derivable from
A0. Thus, the empty set A0 is not saturated in {A | A ≺|= Sat({P},¬P )}. Also, this
natural induction does not follow the formal subformula order since Sat({P},¬P ) is
derived before Sat({P}, P ). N
Example 3.29. The natural induction of Example 3.22:
→ Ev(1)→ Ev(0)→ Ev(3)→ Ev(5)→ . . .
does not respect the formal induction order ≺ev and formalizes an induction process
that does not respect the induction order of the informal definition formalized by∆ev .
In the first step, the empty set is not saturated on {A | A ≺ Ev(1)} = {Ev(0)}. N
In general the induction process is highly underspecified, even if an induction order
is given.
Example 3.30. (Example 3.25 continued). Natural inductions of the informal Defi-
nition 1.2 will derive I |= ϕ only after the satisfaction of all subformulas has been
derived. This constrains the order of rule application, but much freedom is left. There
are infinitely many such natural inductions. A few non-terminal ones are:
→ Sat({P}, P )→ Sat({P}, P ∧ P )→ Sat({P},¬¬P )
→ Sat({P}, P )→ Sat({P},¬¬P )→ Sat({P}, P ∨ P )
Note that both natural inductions respect the subformula order and follow it. Intuition
suggests that these sequences can be extended to converging terminal natural induc-
tions, and this will be proven below. N
19
Given our experience with informal definitions, we expect some “good” properties
of natural inductions that respect the induction order ≺: (1) that they all converge, (2)
that they all follow the induction order, (3) that once an element is derived, it remains
derivable, and (4) that in the limit, the defined set is the intended one. However, none
of these properties holds right now.
The major question is related to (1). It is essential for the non-ambiguity of an
informal ordered definition that all inductions that respect its induction order converge.
This should be provable in our framework. However, it is straightforward to see that
this is not the case. Take the empty induction order ∅ for the definition∆|= in context
structureO. This order is a strict well-founded order and all natural inductions respect
it in a trivial way. As we saw in Examples 3.23 and 3.22, not all of these natural
inductions converge.
As for (2), a counterexample is below.
Example 3.31. Consider the order P ≺ Q and definition:{
Q← t
P ← Q
}
Here is a terminal natural induction:
→ Q→ P
It obviously does not follow ≺ since P ≺ Q. However, it does respect ≺. In the first
step, when Q is derived, the structure A0 = ∅ is saturated on {A | A ≺ Q} = {P},
since P is not derivable. In the second step, A1 = {Q} is trivially saturated on {A |
A ≺ P} = {}. N
A counterexample for (3) and (4) is given below.
Example 3.32. We reconsider∆ev and O from Example 3.11.{
Even(0)← t
∀x(Even(x + 1)← ¬Even(x))
}
(2)
Recall that≺ev is the order induced by the standard order on the natural numbers. That
is, Ev(n) ≺ev Ev(m) if n < m. This order is total, and consequently, there is a
unique terminal natural induction that respects it:
→ Ev(0)→ Ev(2)→ Ev(4)→ . . .→ Ev(2n)→ . . .
This natural induction follows ≺ev and constructs the set of even numbers.
Now take the following non-standard induction order:
Ev(1) ≺ Ev(0) ≺ Ev(2) ≺ Ev(3) ≺ . . .
Also this is a total strict well-founded order. The unique terminal natural induction that
respects ≺ is:
→ Ev(1)→ Ev(0)→ Ev(3)→ Ev(5)→ . . .
Note that Ev(1) is no longer derivable after step 2. Also, this induction clearly does
not construct the intended set. N
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In non-monotone informal definitions, we impose a well-founded induction order
to obtain convergence of the induction process. However, it is clear from the above
examples that in selecting the induction order, great care is required. In general, im-
posing an unsuitable induction order w.r.t. ∆ and O may have a number of undesired
effects as just shown.
The reason for these misbehaviours can be traced back to our earlier claim: that an
induction order ensures convergence by delaying the application of rules until it is safe
to do so. It can be seen that in the above examples, the proposed order does not achieve
this. E.g., the second induction order in the above example (Ex. 3.32) allowed to derive
Ev(1) in the first step when it was not safe to do so; indeed, the derivation of Ev(0) in
the next step violates the premise of the rule that was applied to derive Ev(1). This is
because the proposed order ≺ does not reflect the dependencies between defined facts
induced by the inductive rules. For example, while Ev(0) is strictly larger than Ev(1)
in the proposed induction order, Ev(1) is defined in terms of Ev(0) and hence, if the
value of Ev(0) changes, this may invalidate the definiens of the rule deriving Ev(1).
What emerges from this discussion is what we think to be one of the implicit con-
ventions of the use of informal definitions in mathematics. Although we have never
seen this explicitly stated, not every well-founded order is acceptable for use as induc-
tion order of an informal inductive definition. A “good” definition over an induction
order should define the elementship of an object in the defined relation in terms of
presence or absence of strictly smaller objects in the defined relation. This induces a
constraint between the inductive rules and the induction order: a “good” induction or-
der should match the dependencies amongst the defined facts induced by the inductive
rules. In all above misbehaved examples, this constraint was violated. Such cases are
not found in mathematical text.
We now formalize the intuition that the induction order “matches” the structure
of the rules of a definition and then prove that if this condition is satisfied, the four
properties (1-4) are satisfied. Intuitively, the matching condition is that defined facts
may only “depend” on facts that are strictly smaller in the induction order. First, we
formalize this notion of “dependence”.
Let ∝ be an binary relation on the set At
def (∆)
D of defined domain atoms. We write
A|∝A to denoteA∩{B | B ∝ A}, the structure obtained fromA by making all domain
atoms B 6∝ A false.
Definition 3.33. A binary relation ∝ on At
def (∆)
D is a dependency relation of ∆ in O
if for all A and all A,B, if A|∝A = B|∝A then A ⊢∆ A iffB ⊢∆ A.
If ∝ is a dependency relation, then for any defined atom A, the set {B | B ∝
A} is (a superset of) the set of atoms on which A depends. Indeed, in any pair of
structures that coincide on this set, A is derivable in both or in none. Notice that if ∝
is a dependency relation, then any superset of ∝ is one as well.
It is convenient to extend ∝ to all domain literals. If L is A or ¬A and L′ is B or
¬B, then we define that L ∝ L′ if A ∝ B.
Example 3.34. The definition {P ← P} has a unique dependency relation, namely
P ∝ P . For both {P ← P ∨ ¬P} and {P ← P ∧ ¬P}, the empty binary relation is
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a dependency relation: P does not depend on itself. Indeed, switching the truth value
of P does not affect the value of either the tautology P ∨ ¬P or of the contradiction
P ∧ ¬P . N
That an induction order ≺ “matches” the rules of a definition means that ≺ is a
dependency relation.
Example 3.35. In case of definition ∆ev of even numbers and the structure O of Ex-
ample 3.11, we see that the first order
Ev(0) ≺ Ev(1) ≺ Ev(2) ≺ Ev(3) ≺ . . .
is a dependency of∆ev , while the second order
Ev(1) ≺ Ev(0) ≺ Ev(2) ≺ Ev(3) ≺ . . .
is not. For instance, ∅ and {Ev(0)} are identical on {B | B ≺ Ev(1)} = ∅, but
∅ ⊢∆ Ev(1) while {Ev(0)} 0∆ Ev(1). N
Definition 3.36. We say that ≺ strictly orders ∆ in O if ≺ is a strict well-founded
order and a dependency relation of∆ in O.
Example 3.37. It is an easy exercise to verify that the induction order ≺|= is a depen-
dency of∆|= in the suitable contextO. Since it is a well-founded strict order, it strictly
orders∆|=. Likewise, ≺ev strictly orders∆ev in the natural numbers. N
Natural inductions that respect a relation ≺ that strictly orders ∆ in O satisfy the
good properties (1-3). (1) and (2) are shown by the following two propositions; (3) is
proven later in Proposition 5.5.
Proposition 3.38. If ≺ strictly orders ∆ in O then any natural induction N that re-
spects ≺ also follows ≺.
This proposition is generalized by Proposition 6.3 and will be proven there.
Proposition 3.39. If ∆ is a definition and ≺ an order that strictly orders ∆ in con-
text structure O, then terminal natural inductions that respect ≺ exist and all of them
converge. Moreover the limit is independent of ≺.
This proposition follows from the stronger Theorem 3.50.
The proposition shows that an ordered definition in which ≺ is a dependency of∆
unambiguously defines a set. This proposition inspires the following definitions of a
definition by well-founded induction .
Definition 3.40. Let O be a context structure with domain D. A definition by well-
founded induction over ≺ in O (or briefly, an ordered definition) is a pair (∆,≺) with
∆ a definition and ≺ an order that strictly orders∆.
Interestingly, the convergence property states that the limit is independent of the
selected order. Sometimes this phenomenon can be seen in mathematical text.
22
Example 3.41. The Definition 1.2 defines the satisfaction relation |= over the sub-
formula order (formalized by ≺|=) but it is not uncommon to define it over alternative
induction orders. For example, we could define |= by induction on the size of formulas.
Formally, we define Sat(I, ψ) ≺s Sat(J, φ)) if I = J and the size of ψ (the number
of nodes in its parse tree) is strictly less than the size of φ. Alternatively, we may define
|= by induction on the depth of formulas, i.e., the length of the longest branch in the
parse tree of φ. This order can be formalized similarly; let us denote its formalization
as ≺d. The three orders lead to three variants of Definition 1.2. Intuition suggests that
they are equivalent.
It is indeed easy to verify that the formal orders ≺s and ≺d on the size and depth
of formulas are supersets of ≺|=. Hence, they are dependencies of ∆|= in O as well.
It follows from Proposition 3.39 that the natural inductions that respect them converge
to the same defined set. This confirms that the three informal definitions are indeed
equivalent.
This does not mean that they have the same natural inductions. For instance, recon-
sider the natural induction of Example 3.30:
→ Sat({P}, P )→ Sat({P},¬¬P )→ Sat({P}, P ∨ P )
This one respects and follows the subformula order and the size order. However, it does
not respect the depth order, since A1 is not saturated on {B | B ≺ Sat({I},¬¬P )}.
For instance, Sat({P}, P ∨ P ) is derivable but not derived and P ∨ P has strictly
smaller depth than ¬¬P .
N
Falsifiability In this section, we introduced and formalized two hypotheses about or-
dered definitions in mathematics: that their induction order is always a dependency of
the definition (Definition 3.33) and how an induction process respects the induction or-
der (Definition 3.26). The former hypothesis stems from the view that such a definition
defines elements of the defined sets in terms of strictly smaller elements. Certainly,
these hypotheses cannot be proven but they are falsifiable in concrete “experiments”.
They are satisfied in the satisfaction Definition 1.2 and the evenness Definition 3.10, in
their formal representations and in all other informal definitions over an induction order
that the authors are aware of. Also, as formally proven in Proposition 3.39, definitions
and inductions satisfying these hypotheses possess the indispensible confluence prop-
erty: all induction processes converge to the same limit. Thus, such definitions define
a set.
Generalizing monotone and ordered definitions.
There is an obvious similarity between Propositions 3.20 and 3.39 of the confluence of
natural inductions of monotone and ordered definitions. However, neither is a gener-
alization of the other. Not all monotone definitions are ordered. For instance, for the
definition∆TC of transitive closure in O, there is no ≺ that strictly orders∆TC in O.
Indeed, due to the transitivity rule, all defined domain atoms depend on each other; the
only dependency relation is the total one and this is not a strict order.
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We now define the more general class of iterated inductive definitions, which en-
compasses all ordered definitions as well as all monotone definitions. We will then
prove a theorem for this more general class that generalizes both of the earlier results.
The general idea of iterated inductive definitions is that they admit a dependency
∝ that is not a strict order; however, if atoms A,B depend on each other (that is,
A ∝ B ∝ A), then they depend monotonically on each other: deriving B may switch
A from underivable to derivable but not from derivable to underivable;A’s effect on B
is similar.
For a given dependency ∝, we define A ≺∝ B if A ∝ B and B 6∝ A. If ∝ is
transitive, then ≺∝ is a strict order. In that case, ≺∝ divides the set of domain atoms
into a set of strictly ordered “layers” such that, for all A,B, if A ≺∝ B, then A is in a
strictly lower layer thanB, and if A ∝ B ∝ A, they are in the same layer. If moreover,
the layers form a well-founded order then we have an iterated inductive definition.
Natural inductions of an iterated inductive definition proceed along the order ≺∝.
Such a natural induction closes layer by layer using monotone “sub-inductions” that
take place inside a single layer, and starts a new monotone induction in the next layer
as soon as one layer is saturated. To ensure this behaviour, the same condition is
imposed on natural inductions as for an ordered definition: an atom A may be derived
at step i only if Ai is saturated on {B | B ≺∝ A}.
We now formalize these ideas.
Definition 3.42. A relation ∝ is a monotone dependency relation of ∆ in O if for all
defined A, for all A,B such that A|≺∝A = B|≺∝A and A|∝A ⊆ B|∝A, if A ⊢∆ A
thenB ⊢∆ A.
Proposition 3.43. If ∝ is a monotone dependency relation of ∆ in O then ∝ is a
dependency relation of∆ in O.
Proof. If A|∝A = B|∝A, then A ⊢∆ A impliesB ⊢∆ A and vice versa.
Just as for dependencies, it is easy to see that any superset of a monotone de-
pendency is a monotone dependency as well. In particular, the transitive closure of a
monotone dependency is one. Thus, any definition that admits a monotone dependency
admits a transitive monotone dependency.
Definition 3.44. A relation ∝ monotonically orders∆ in O if ∝ is transitive, ≺∝ is a
strict well-founded order and ∝ is a monotone dependency relation of∆ in O.
Definition 3.45. We say that a natural inductionN respects (follows) a transitive rela-
tion ∝ if it respects (follows) ≺∝ according to Definition 3.26.
Thus, if N respects ∝ and A ∈ Ai+1 \ Ai then Ai|≺∝A is saturated. If N follows
∝ then for every A and B derived by N , A ≺∝ B implies ‖A‖N < ‖B‖N .
We have already defined the concept of a monotone and ordered definition in con-
text structureO. Now, we also define the concept of an iterated inductive definition (in
O).
Definition 3.46. A definition ∆ is a definition by iterated induction over ∝ in O if ∝
monotonically orders∆ in O.
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We first show that iterated inductive definitions generalize monotone and ordered
definition. For a monotone definition, the entire set of all domain atoms can serve as a
single layer. Let ∝t denote the total binary relation on At
def (∆)
∆ . Note that ≺∝t= ∅.
Proposition 3.47. A definition ∆ is monotone in O iff ∆ is a definition by iterated
induction over ∝t in O. A natural induction of ∆ in O (trivially) respects ∝t.
Proof. Since ≺∝t= ∅, the condition that ∆ is an iterated definition over ∝t in O
collapses to the condition that for all A, A,B such that A ⊆ B, if A ⊢∆ A then
B ⊢∆ B. This is precisely the monotonicity condition.
Example 3.48. Consider the formal definition ∆TC of transitive closure and the con-
text structure O with domain {a, b, c} of Example 3.15. The total binary relation of
At
def (∆)
D is the one and only dependency relation of∆TC in O. N
Proposition 3.49. For a binary relation ∝, a definition ∆ is a definition by well-
founded induction over ∝ in O iff ∆ is by iterated induction over ∝ in O and in
addition,∝ is irreflexive and asymmetric (and hence, a strict order).
Proof. Obvious from the definitions.
Given that monotone and ordered definitions are special cases of iterated inductive
definitions, the following proposition presents a generalization of both Proposition 3.20
and Proposition 3.39.
Theorem 3.50. Assume that ∆ is by iterated induction over ∝ in O. Then terminal
natural inductions that respect ∝ exist and all converge. Moreover, the limit is inde-
pendent of ∝.
This theorem follows from Theorem 5.7 and will be proven below.
Definition 3.51. The structure defined by a definition ∆ by iterated induction over ∝
in O is the limit of any terminal natural induction that respects ∝.
Informal iterated inductive definitions Above, formal iterated inductive definitions
were introduced as a mathematical generalization of monotone and ordered definition.
In this section we discuss their application in mathematical text.
Quite a few definitions in mathematical text contain iterated applications of nested
monotone induction. However, they are only rarely formulated as sets of informal rules.
To phrase them, formal scientists typically use other tools from their toolbox, such as
fixpoints of operators. A well-known iterated inductive definition is the alternating fix-
point definition of the well-founded model (Van Gelder, 1993). In this definition, the
well-founded model of logic program Π is characterised as the limit of an alternating
fixpoint construction of an anti-monotone operator A. This operator, called the stable
operator A of Π is defined on structures A by defining A(A) as the least fixpoint of
some monotone operator λxT (x,A) associated to Π (essentially, the four-valued im-
mediate consequence operator ofΠ). This is an iterated induction in the sense that each
of the steps in alternating sequence involves itself a monotone inductive construction.
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A rare case where iterated induction is explicitly available in rule form is in the
definition of a stable theory (Marek, 1989) which is a set of propositional modal logic
formulas closed under the standard inference rules and two additional ones:
⊢ ψ
⊢ Kψ
6⊢ ψ
⊢ ¬Kψ
The second is a non-monotone rule. The set is computed by iterated induction for
increasing modal nesting depth of modal formulas.
In the following example, we rephrase the definition of the satisfaction relation of
multi-agent modal logic as an informal iterated inductive definition.
Example 3.52. Consider the multi-agent modal logic with a finite set of agentsA, the
standard propositional connectives, for each agent a ∈ A the epistemic operator Ka,
and for each group of agents g ⊆ A the common knowledge operator Cg and its dual
operatorDCg . These operators satisfy the standard condition Cgϕ⇔ ¬DCg¬ϕ.
The satisfaction relation is defined in terms of (multi-agent) Kripke structures and
worlds. A multi-agent Kripke structure is a tuple K = 〈W , ξ, L,A, R〉 with W a set
of worlds, ξ a propositional vocabulary, L : W → 2ξ a function from worlds to ξ
-structures, A the set of agents, and R ⊆ W × A × W the accessibility relation: if
(w1, a, w2) ∈ R then according to agent a, world w2 is accessible from world w1.
The formula Cgϕ holds in a world w if every finite path from w through the union
of the accessibility relations of agents in g ends in a world w′ that satisfies ϕ. Corre-
spondingly,DCgϕ holds if at least one such a path exists; that is, if a world satisfying ϕ
is reachable in the combined accessibility relation of the agents of g. This reachability
condition can be expressed through a monotone inductive rule. Cgϕ can be defined in
terms ofDCg¬ϕ using a non-monotone rule.
Below, we specify the informal definition together with its monotone dependency
relation ∝. The right column specifies for each inductive rule the dependencies that it
generates, and whether these dependencies are cyclic (A ∝ B) or not (A ≺∝ B). In
this definition, the domain atoms are of the form K, w |= ϕ. For brevity, we drop the
argumentK.
– K, w |= p if p ∈ ξ and p ∈ L(w)
– K, w |= ¬ϕ if K, w 6|= ϕ (w |= ϕ) ≺∝ (w |= ¬ϕ)
– K, w |= ψ ∧ φ if K, w |= ψ and K, w |= φ
(w |= ψ) ≺∝ (w |= ψ ∧ φ),
(w |= φ) ≺∝ (w |= ψ ∧ φ)
– K, w |= ψ ∨ φ if K, w |= ψ or K, w |= φ (or both)
(w |= ψ) ≺∝ (w |= ψ ∨ φ),
(w |= φ) ≺∝ (w |= ψ ∨ φ)
–
K, w |= Kaϕ if there exists (w, a, w
′) ∈ R such that
K, w′ |= ϕ
(w′ |= ϕ) ≺∝ (w |= Kaϕ)
–
K, w |= DCgϕ if there exists (w, a, w′) ∈ R such that
a ∈ g and K, w′ |= ϕ
(w′ |= ϕ) ≺∝ (w |= DCgϕ)
–
K, w |= DCgϕ if there exists (w, a, w′) ∈ R such that
a ∈ g and K, w′ |= DCgϕ
(w′ |= DCgϕ) ∝ (w |= DCgϕ)
– K, w |= Cgϕ if K, w 6|= ¬DCgϕ. (w |= DCg¬ϕ) ≺∝ (w |= Cgϕ).
The relation∝ is the transitive closure of the collection of all tuples specified in the
right column, for all w,w′ and all formulasϕ, ψ, φ,Kaϕ,DCgϕ,Cgϕ. ∝ is not a strict
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order since it contains cycles. The cycles are the dependencies (w′ |= DCgϕ) ∝ (w |=
DCgϕ) induced by the second, monotone rule forDCgϕ. It can be easily verified that
the strict order ≺∝ is well-founded.
The definition contains non-monotone rules for ¬ϕ and for Cgϕ. The definition
is not an ordered definition, since ∝ is not a strict order. However, ∝ is a monotone
dependency relation of this iterated inductive definition. Consequently, all natural in-
ductions that respect ∝ converge to the intended relation. Hence, this is a well-defined
informal iterated inductive definition.
N
Also in knowledge representation, one sometimes finds natural applications of it-
erated inductive definitions that can be faithfully expressed as rule sets. For instance,
Denecker and Ternovska (2007) argued that dynamic systems with cyclic ramifications
can be naturally described using iterated inductive definitions.
Summary: implications for informal definitions The formalization of definitions
in this section exposes and proves several fundamental properties of informal defini-
tions.
First, that the “non-constructive” characterization of the defined set as the least set
satisfying the rules, is incorrect in case of non-monotone (ordered or iterated) defini-
tions.
Second, that the induction process, seen as the iterated application of rules, is highly
non-deterministic, and therefore that convergence is all-important. In mathematical
practice, we typically take this property for granted. In fact, it is not trivial at all. It
is a fundamentally important property of inductive definitions, of great pragmatical
importance.
Third, we formalized how the induction order is to be used in the induction process
in the concept of a natural induction respecting an induction order.
Fourth, in mathematical texts, we have a certain degree of freedom when it comes
to choosing the induction order for an inductive definition. Nevertheless, the order
is far from arbitrary and needs to match the structure of the rules. This match was
formalized in the concept of dependency. Our exposition clarifies the role and nature
of the induction order, the match with the definitional rules and how the induction order
constrains the order of rule application. We were then able to state Theorem 3.50 that
all natural inductions that respect such a relation converge (the proof is given in the
next sections).
Last but not least, it also appears from Theorem 3.50 that the choice of the induc-
tion order is irrelevant as long as it matches the rules. The order does not affect the
semantics of the definition. In view of this, one may wonder why an induction order is
specified at all in mathematical text. This will be explored in the next sections.
Related work on iterated induction Iterated inductive definitions were studied in
(Kreisel, 1963; Feferman, 1970; Martin-Lo¨f, 1971; Buchholz et al., 1981). In the for-
malisms of (Kreisel, 1963; Feferman, 1970; Martin-Lo¨f, 1971), a strict syntactical strat-
ification condition on rule sets ensure that the rule set∆ admits a monotone dependency
in every context O and hence, is an iterated definition in every O. This condition is
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similar to the notion of stratification in logic programming (Apt et al., 1988). A disad-
vantage of this approach is that many (nonmonotone) informal and formal definitions
are sensible definitions in one context but not in another. E.g., the evenness Defini-
tion 3.10 and its faithful representation ∆ev are sensible definitions in the context of
the natural numbers, but not in the context of the integer numbers. Indeed, in the inte-
ger numbers, the only dependency of this definition is still the standard order but this
order is not well-founded in the integers. Also the satisfaction Definition 1.2 is not an
ordered definition in every contextO.
A more general approach is the logic of iterated induction (IID) presented by
Buchholz et al. (1981). There, an iterated inductive definition is expressed via a sec-
ond order logic formula that expresses a definition∆ and, independently, an induction
order ≺. They use this logic to study proof-theoretic strength and expressivity of iter-
ated definitions. In the IID formalism, the order can be chosen independently of the
definition; there is no requirement similar to our notion of dependency. We showed
that the risks of choosing an order that does not match with the definition are that (1)
there is no convergence of different induction processes, and (2) that an unintended set
is constructed. The first problem is avoided in the logic of Buchholz et al. (1981). Es-
sentially, the second order formula constrains the induction process to a single process.
As for the second problem, it is possible in this formalism to encode an induction order
that does not match the rules. For example, one can encode the definition∆ev with the
non-matching order Ev(1) ≺ Ev(0) ≺ Ev(2) ≺ . . . , in which case the unintended
set {Ev(1), Ev(0), Ev(3), Ev(5), . . . } is constructed.
In some sense, the IID logic is more general than the formalism here, since by se-
lecting different induction orders for the same rule set, different induction processes
and different defined sets can be obtained. If our hypothesis about the link between
rules and induction order is correct, this extra expressivity does not cover useful ground,
moreover it poses two disadvantages. First, formally expressing an induction order in
the logic might be as complex as expressing the definition itself, if not more. Second, it
also makes the knowledge representation process more error-prone, if there is no way
to prevent that an order is encoded that does not match with the definition. To have
to express the induction order seems like a needless complication of the knowledge
representation process.
To us it seems preferable to design a logic of definitions in which only the rules need
to be represented and the order is left implicit. Indeed, Theorem 3.50 gives us license
to do this, because it shows that all induction orders that fit the structure of the rules of
∆ produce the same unique limit of their terminal natural inductions. Nevertheless, it
could be useful to express an induction order as a “parity check’ for the correctness of
the definition.
4 Safe natural inductions
In the previous section, we argued that the role of the induction order is to delay the
application of a rule until it is safe to do so, i.e., until later rule applications cannot
violate the premise of the rule anymore. In this section, we formalize this intuition and
prove its correctness.
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To define safe natural inductions, we need a slightly extended notion of natural
induction that starts from an arbitrary def (∆)-structure A rather than from ∅.
Definition 4.1. We define a natural inductionN of ∆ from a def (∆)-structure A in
O in the same way as Definition 3.13 except that A0 = A.
We introduce the following notations. Given a natural induction N with limit
lim(N ) = A and a natural induction N ′ from A, their composition N + N ′ is ob-
tained by appending N ′ after N . Clearly, the result is a natural induction. Also, for a
natural induction N = 〈Aα〉0≤α≤β and 0 ≤ i ≤ j ≤ β, we write Ni→j to denote the
segment 〈Ai,Ai+1, . . . ,Aj〉 ofN . This is a natural induction from Ai.
Definition 4.2. A defined atom A is safely derivable by ∆ in structure A if A ⊢∆ A
and for each natural inductionN of∆ from A, it holds that lim(N ) ⊢∆ A. The set of
safely derivable atoms from A is denoted Safe∆(A).
Definition 4.3. We call A strictly underivable by ∆ in structure A if for each natural
inductionN of ∆ from A, it holds that lim(N ) 0∆ A. The set of strictly underivable
atoms from A is denoted Underivable∗∆(A).
We will see that in a terminal natural induction, every atom that is safely derivable
at some stage, is eventually derived. An atom that is strictly underivable at some stage
is never derived.
Definition 4.4. The structureB is safely derivable fromA ifA ⊆ B ⊆ A∪Safe∆(A).
Equivalently, if A ⊆ B and everyA ∈ B \ A is safely derivable in A.
Definition 4.5. A natural induction N = 〈Aα〉α≤β from A is safe if for each α < β,
Aα+1 is safely derivable from Aα.
An obvious property of safe natural inductions is that any atom A that is derived at
some stage i remains derivable at later stages. The following proposition states that in
a natural induction the sets of safely derivable and of strictly underivable defined atoms
grow monotonically.
Proposition 4.6. If N = 〈Aα〉α≤β is a natural induction from A, then for all 0 ≤ i <
j ≤ β, Safe∆(Ai) ⊆ Safe∆(Aj) and Underivable
∗
∆(Ai) ⊆ Underivable
∗
∆(Aj).
Proof. Assume that A ∈ Safe∆(Ai) is not safely derivable in Aj . Let N
′ be a natural
induction from Aj such that lim(N ′) 0∆ A. Then Ni→j + N ′ is a natural induction
from Ai to lim(N ′). Hence, A is not safely derivable in Ai. Contradiction. The case
for underivability is similar.
Proposition 4.7. Let N = 〈Aα〉α≤β , N ′ = 〈Bα〉α≤γ be two safe natural inductions
from the same structure A. For every i ≤ β, j ≤ γ it holds that if i + 1 ≤ β then
Ai+1 ∪Bj is safely derivable from Ai ∪Bj and if j +1 ≤ γ then Ai ∪Bj+1 is safely
derivable from Ai ∪Bj .
Proof. The product order≤ for ordinal pairs (given by (i, j) ≤ (k, l) if i ≤ k, j ≤ l) is
a well-founded order, hence every set of such pairs contains minimal elements in this
order.
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Assume towards contradiction that pairs (i, j) ≤ (β, γ) exist that contradict the
proposition, and let (i, j) be a minimal such pair in the product order. Hence, either
Ai+1 ∪Bj exists and is not safely derivable from Ai ∪Bj , or Ai ∪Bj+1 exists and is
not safely derivable.
Assume that it is the first case. Thus, Ai+1 ∪ Bj exists (i.e., i + 1 ≤ β) and
Ai+1∪Bj is not safely derivable fromAi∪Bj : at least one domain atomA ∈ Ai+1\Ai
is safely derivable from Ai but not from Ai ∪ Bj . By the minimality of (i, j), the
sequence N” = 〈Ai ∪ Bα〉0≤α≤j contains only safe derivations and hence, it is a
natural induction from Ai to Ai ∪Bj . Since the set of safely derivable domain atoms
grows in this sequence (Proposition 4.6),A is safely derivable fromAi∪Bj . We obtain
the contradiction. The second case is obtained by symmetry.
It follows that every path in the “matrix” of structures Ai ∪Bj obtained by incre-
menting at each step either i or j by 1, is a safe natural induction.
Definition 4.8. N is safe-terminal ifN is safe and Safe∆(lim(N )) ⊆ lim(N ).
In other words, a safe natural inductionN is safe-terminal if it cannot be extended
to a larger safe natural induction.
Theorem 4.9. All safe-terminal natural inductions converge to the same structure.
Proof. Take two safe-terminal natural inductions N = 〈Aα〉α≤β , N ′ = 〈Bα〉α≤γ .
Consider the sequence 〈Cα〉α≤β+γ where Cα = Aα if α ≤ β and Cβ+α = Aβ ∪Bα
if α ≤ γ. This sequence corresponds to the path through the matrix going first from
∅ to Aβ following N and then from Aβ to Aβ ∪ Bγ . By Proposition 4.7, this is a
safe natural induction. Since Safe∆(Aβ) = ∅, the sequence is constant starting from
Cβ; i.e., Cβ+α = Aβ for all α ≤ γ. Hence Aβ = Aβ ∪ Bγ and Bγ ⊆ Aβ . By a
symmetrical argument also the converse inclusion holds.
Definition 4.10. The structure safely defined by∆ inO is the limit of any safe-terminal
natural induction of∆ in O.
The results of this section show that imposing safety on natural inductions ensures
confluence. We still need to show that natural inductions that respect a suitable induc-
tion order are safe. This is done in the next section.
5 Existence and confluence of natural inductions in or-
dered and iterated definitions
We now explore basic properties of informal inductive definitions. Often they are “ev-
ident” to us; some are critical for practical reasoning on informal inductive definitions.
Nevertheless, they are non-trivial and here we prove them in the context of the formal
framework.
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Existence of terminal natural inductions We show that the condition on ∝ in the
definition of ordered and iterated inductive definitions that ≺∝ is a strict well-founded
order, serves to ensure that a sound non-terminal natural induction can always be ex-
tended to a terminal one. Thus, a sound induction process cannot “stall” in the middle.
Proposition 5.1. Let ∆ be a definition, O a context structure, ∝ a transitive binary
relation on At
def (∆)
D . If ≺∝ is a well-founded strict order, then any natural induction
N that respects ∝ can be extended to a terminal natural induction that respects ∝.
Note that for this proposition to hold, it is not necessary that ∝ is a dependency
relation of∆ in O but only that ≺∝ is a strict well-founded order.
Proof. Assume towards contraction that N respects ∝ but cannot be extended to a
terminal natural induction that respects ∝. Without loss of generality, we may assume
thatN is a maximal such a sequence, that is, it respects ∝ but cannot be extended to a
natural induction that respects∝. LetN ’s last element beAβ . SinceN is non-terminal,
there exists at least oneA such thatAβ ⊢∆ A andAAβ = f . Consider the set of all such
atoms. Since≺∝ is a well-founded order, this set has at least one≺∝-minimal element
A. Due to its minimality, Aβ is saturated on {B ∈ At
def (∆)
D | B ≺∝ A}. Hence, the
extension ofN withAβ∪{A} is a natural induction that respects∝. Contradiction.
The condition of well-foundedness of ≺∝ is necessary. E.g., when interpreting the
definition∆ev in the context of the integer numbers instead of the natural numbers, the
strict order {Ev(n) ≺ Ev(m) | n < m ∈ Z} is a dependency of the definition ∆ev .
Nevertheless, the definition does not have non-trivial natural inductions that respect
this order, and this is due to the fact that the order is not well-founded.
Confluence of terminal natural inductions.
Proposition 5.2. A terminal safe natural induction is safe-terminal.
Proof. Trivial since safely derivable atoms are derivable.
All safe-terminal natural inductions converge. Safe natural inductions that are ter-
minal are safe-terminal. Thus, to prove the confluence of terminal natural inductions
of ∆ respecting a suitable ∝, it suffices to prove that natural inductions respecting ∝
are safe.
Let ∝ be an arbitrary binary relation on the defined domain atoms.
Definition 5.3. A set S of domain atoms is ∝-closed if for all A ∈ S, for all B ∝ A,
it holds that B ∈ S.
We observe that if ∝ is transitive then for every A, {B | B ∝ A} is ∝-closed.
The next proposition states that once some intermediate structure Ai in a natural
induction N is saturated on a ∝-closed set S, then the value and derivability of atoms
of S does not change anymore later in N .
Proposition 5.4. Assume ∝ monotically orders ∆ in O. Let A be a structure and N
an arbitrary natural induction from A.
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1. If A is saturated on a ∝-closed set S, then lim(N ) ∩ S = A ∩ S.
2. If A is saturated on {B | B ∝ A} then if A ⊢∆ A then lim(N ) ⊢∆ A.
Proof. Let N be of the form 〈Aα〉0≤α≤β with A0 = A.
(1) We prove Aα ∩ S = A ∩ S for all α ≤ β by induction on α.
It trivially holds for α = 0 since A0 = A.
Assume it holds for α. For any A ∈ S, it holds that {B | B ∝ A} ⊆ S, hence
Aα ∩ {B | B ∝ A} = A ∩ {B | B ∝ A}. Since ∝ is dependency of ∆, it follows
that Aα ⊢∆ A iff A ⊢∆ A. Since A is saturated on S, it is saturated on {B | B ∝ A}.
Hence, if Aα ⊢∆ A then A ∈ A. Consequently,Aα+1 ∩ S = A ∩ S.
Finally, assume that for limit ordinal λ, for every α < λ, it holds that Aα ∩ S =
A ∩ S. Then obviously, Aλ ∩ S = (∪α<λAα) ∩ S = ∪α<λ(Aα ∩ S) = A ∩ S.
(2) Since the set {B | B ≺∝ A} is ∝-closed, it follows from (1) that
A ∩ {B | B ≺∝ A} = lim(N ) ∩ {B | B ≺∝ A}
Also, it holds that A ⊆ lim(N ), hence
A ∩ {B | B ∝ A} ⊆ lim(N ) ∩ {B | B ∝ A}
Since ∝ is a monotone dependency, it holds that A ⊢∆ A entails that lim(N ) ⊢∆
A.
Proposition 5.5. Let ∝ be a monotone dependency of∆ in O.
(a) If a natural inductionN = 〈Aα〉0≤α≤β respects ∝ then N is safe.
(b) If for some i ≥ 0, Ai is saturated on {B | B ∝ A} and A 6∈ Ai, A is strictly
underivable.
(c) If Ai ⊢∆ A and A is saturated on {B | B ≺∝ A}, then A is safely derivable in
Ai.
Proof. (a) follows from (c). (b) and (c) are straightforward consequences of Proposi-
tion 5.4.
The above proposition is a formalization of properties of informal inductive defini-
tions that, just like the confluence property of inductive constructions, we may easily
take for granted but that are indispensable for practical reasoning. Indeed, they offer a
way of deciding membership of certain facts in the defined relation while constructing
only a fraction of it. To decide whether A belongs to the defined set, we “tweak” a
partial induction process towards deriving A or towards saturation on {B | B ∝ A}.
If A is derived, then it belongs to the defined set. If the natural induction gets saturated
on {B | B ∝ A} and has not derivedA, A does not belong to the defined set.
Example 5.6. It hold that {Q} |= ¬P ∧ Q and {Q} 6|= ¬(¬P ∧ Q). We can prove
both using the following very short non-terminal natural induction of∆|=:
({Q},¬P )→ ({Q}, Q)→ ({Q},¬P ∧Q)
Indeed, this natural induction respects the induction order ≺|= of Example 3.25 and
hence, it can be extended to a terminal one that converges to the defined set; hence, the
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defined set includes ({Q},¬P ∧ Q). Also, the limit of this short natural induction is
saturated on {A | A ≺|= ({Q},¬(¬P ∧Q))} and ({Q},¬(¬P ∧Q)) is not derivable
from it. N
Theorem 5.7. Assume ∝ monotonically orders ∆ in O. Then terminal natural induc-
tions that respect ∝ exist and all converge to the same limit. Moreover, the limit is
independent of ∝. It is the safely defined structure of∆ in O.
Proof. Existence follows from Proposition 5.1. Terminal natural inductions that re-
spect ∝ are safe-terminal natural inductions and all of them converge to the safely
defined structure. This structure does not depend on ∝.
We have shown here that our intuition is right: that natural inductions that delay
the derivation of defined atoms until it is safe, converge. Moreover, since safe natural
inductions do not depend on the induction order, the set defined by a definition over
some induction order does not depend on that order.
So far, ordered and iterated definitions were defined as pairs (∆,∝) of rule sets
and suitable induction order. The confluence theorem entitles us to drop ∝ from the
definition.
Definition 5.8. A rule set ∆ is an ordered definition in O if some ≺ strictly orders∆
in O. A rule set ∆ is an iterated definition in O if some ∝ monotonically orders∆ in
O. For any monotone, ordered or iterated definition ∆ in O, the structure defined by
∆ in O is the safely defined structure.
6 Other properties of definitions
Safe natural inductions go faster Natural inductions that respect a suitable ∝ are
safe. The converse does not hold. The following example shows that safe natural
inductions do not necessarily respect the induction order, and that they may derive a
fact in far fewer steps than an induction that respects the induction order.
Example 6.1. A (two-step) natural induction of the satisfaction definition ∆|= that
does not respect the induction order:
→ Sat({P}, P )→ {Sat({P}, P∨ϕ) | ϕ a formula over the propositional vocabulary ξ}
Indeed, after the first step Sat({P}, P ) is derived in structure A1. It is easy to see that
A1 ⊢∆ Sat({P}, P ∨ϕ) for every ϕ. In fact, since the rule defining Sat({P}, P ∨ϕ)
is monotone, the fact is derivable in each superset ofA1 and hence, it remains derivable
in every natural induction from A1. Therefore, each domain atom Sat({P}, P ∨ ϕ)
is safely derivable from A1. Of course, the induction does not respect the induction
order. N
On the level of informal definitions, the safe natural induction in Example 6.1 prob-
ably matches how many of us derive the satisfaction of a disjunction A |= ϕ ∨ ψ: if a
disjunct ϕ is derived to be satisfied, we jump to the conclusion that ϕ ∨ ψ is satisfied,
even if the value of ψ is still unknown. Strictly speaking, here we are violating the
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induction order! It is nevertheless safe. This derivation step is a safe one, and any fact
derived during a safe natural induction is correct.
A difficulty of computing safe natural inductions is to determine the safety of a
derivation. The following proposition gives a simple but useful criterion.
Proposition 6.2. If for structure A and defined domain atom A it holds that A′ ⊢∆ A
for every A′≥t A, then A is safely derivable from A.
Proof. Obvious, since the limit of every natural induction from A is a superset of A.
The proposition reveals a simple but useful criterion to decide whether a defined
atomA is safely derivable at some stageAi of the induction: it suffices that it is deriable
by a monotone rule at that stage. This was exploited in Example 6.1. As such the
criterion for deciding safety of a derivation at the formal level proven in the proposition
explains a common and useful practice with informal definitions.
Natural inductions that respect∝ follow∝ An expected property is that inductions
follow the induction order, that is, if B ≺∝ A are both derived byN , thenB is derived
before A. We already discussed this for ordered inductive definitions. The property
holds more generally for iterated inductive definitions.
Proposition 6.3. Assume that ∝ monotonically orders ∆ in O. If a natural induction
N respects ∝ then N follows ∝.
Proof. IfA ∈ Ai+1\Ai, thenAi is saturated in {B | B ≺∝ A}. Hence, by Proposition
5.4, for every j ≥ i, Aj|≺∝A = Ai|≺∝A. Hence, if B ≺∝ A and B ∈ Aj+1 \Aj , then
it holds that j < i.
Safe natural inductions do not necessarily follow the induction order. E.g., a safe
induction that derives first {P} |= P , then {P} |= P ∨ ϕ may be extended to derive
subformulas of ϕ and in that case, it does not follow the induction order.
The defined structure is a fixpoint of∆ Another intuitively obvious property of the
considered sorts of informal definitions is that the defined set is a fixpoint of its induced
operator. Formally, a defined domain atom P (a¯) holds if and only if it is derivable by
one of the rules. In other words, the defined set is a fixpoint of the induced operator
ΓO∆ (Definition 3.17).
Proposition 6.4. Let ∆ be a definition by iterated induction over ∝ in O. If A is the
structure defined by∆ in O, then A is a fixpoint of ΓO∆.
Proof. Select an arbitrary terminal natural inductionN with limit A. Then any A ∈ A
was safely derived at stage ‖A‖N , and by safety A ⊢∆ A. Vice versa, if A ⊢∆ A then
since A is saturated, A ∈ A.
It is well known that the converse property does not hold, i.e., not every fixpoint of
the operator is the defined structure of ∆ in O. For instance, for any context structure
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O, the definition ∆TC of transitive closure has always a fixpoint A in which RA is
the complete binary relation on the domain. Also the iterated inductive definition of
satisfaction of multi-agent logic in Example 3.52 has multiple fixpoints.3
However, if ∆ is an ordered definition by induction over ≺, then the fixpoint is
unique.
Proposition 6.5. Let ∆ be a definition by ordered induction over the well-founded
order ≺ in O. A is the defined structure by∆ in O if and only if A is a fixpoint of ΓO∆.
Proof. If suffices to prove that the operator has only one fixpoint. Assume it has two
different fixpoints A,B and assume that A is a domain atom on which A,B disagree
that is minimal in ≺. Such a minimal atom certainly exists since ≺ is a strict well-
founded order. Then it holds that A ∩ {B | B ≺} = B ∩ {B | B ≺ A}. Since ≺ is a
dependency of∆, it holds that A ⊢∆ A iffB ⊢∆ A. Contraction.
Proposition 6.6. Let∆ be a definition by iterated induction over∝ inO. The structure
A defined by∆ in O is a minimal fixpoint of ΓO∆.
Note that ΓO∆ may have many minimal fixpoints.
Proof. Assume towards contradiction that the defined structure A is not a minimal
fixpoint of ΓO∆ and that A
′ is a strictly lesser one. Consider a natural induction N
that respects ∝ and constructs A. Let i be the minimal ordinal such that some atom
A ∈ A \ A′ is derived at Ai. Since N respects ∝, Ai is saturated on the downward
closed set {B | B ≺∝ A}. By minimality of i, Ai ⊆ A′ and Ai ∩ {B | B ≺∝
A} = A ∩ {B | B ≺∝ A} = A′ ∩ {B | B ≺∝ A}. Since Ai ⊢∆ A and ∝ is a
monotone dependency, it follows that A′ ⊢∆ A and hence, that A ∈ ΓO∆(A
′) = A′.
Contradiction.
Another good question is whether the safely defined set of a formal definition∆ in
O is a fixpoint. It obviously is if the definition is an iterated definition but what if it is
not? It will be considered later in this text, when we consider less sensible definitions
and definitional paradoxes.
The two experiments We finalize our discussion of the two “experiments” intro-
duced in Section 1.
Example 6.7. In previous examples, we verified that ∆TC faithfully expresses Defi-
nition 1.1 and that an induction process of the informal definition in the context of a
graph G corresponds to a natural induction in the corresponding context structureO. It
follows that the formally and informally defined sets correspond. N
Example 6.8. Likewise, we verified that ∆|= faithfully expresses Definition 1.2, that
a context structure O corresponds to the pair of sets of structures and formulas for
propositional vocabulary ξ, that the induction order ≺|= in context O corresponds to
the subformula order, that natural inductions respecting ≺|= in context O correspond
to induction processes “along” the subformula order. It follows that the formally and
informally defined sets correspond. N
3Fixpoints exist in which all formulas DCgϕ are satisfied; the monotone inductive rule maintains this
set when applying the operator.
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Complexity of computing the safely defined structure in finite context In this
section, we investigate the data complexity of deciding a defined domain atom in the
safely defined structure. Hence, here we will focus on finite definitions and contexts.
Let∆ be a fixed definition over Σ = pars(∆) ∪ def (∆). We assume (without loss
of generality due to the finiteness of ∆) that each defined predicate P ∈ def (∆) is
defined by exactly one rule
∀x¯(P (x¯)← ϕP [x¯]).
A key computation step in a safe natural induction is the verification that a domain
atom P (a¯) is safely derivable from A in O. We will show that problem is in co-NP.
Theorem 6.9. For a given finite definition ∆, the problem of deciding whether a de-
fined domain atom P (a¯) is safely derivable from a def (∆)-structure A in finite context
O is in co-NP.
Proof. Algorithm 1 contains a nondeterministic program to decide that P (a¯) is not
safely derivable fromA inO. It takes as inputA,O, P (a¯) and∆. LetD be the domain
of A and O. This program nondeterministically traverses a natural induction from ∆
Algorithm 1 Nondeterministic algorithm to decide that P (a¯) is not safely derivable
from A in O.
while true do
S ←
{
Q(b¯) ∈ At
def (∆)
D | A |= ϕQ[b¯]
}
if P (a¯) 6∈ S then
return true
else if S ⊆ A then
return false
else
choose a non-empty subset S′ ⊆ S \ A
A← A ∪ S′
end if
end while
in O. Every state A′ that can be reached by a natural induction from A can be reached
by a run of this program. The algorithm stops with true when it reaches a structure
in which P (a¯) is not derivable; this shows that P (a¯) is not safely derivable. It stops
with false if the reached structure is saturated and still derives P (a¯). In this case,
the traversed natural induction was a terminal one that was not a witness that P (a¯) was
not safely derivable.
One run of the algorithm builds a strictly growing sequences of def (∆)-structures;
hence, the number of iterations is bound by the cardinality of the set At
def (∆)
D of de-
fined domain atoms. This number is polynomial in the size of O. At each step, the
main computation is the computation of S, the set of derivable domain atoms from A.
This is a polynomial operation. Thus, this is a nondeterministic polynomial program
that has a run that terminates with true if and only P (a¯) is not safely derivable from
A in O. It follows that deciding that P (a¯) is not safely derivable from A in O is in NP
and its dual is in co-NP.
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Theorem 6.10. For every ∆, the problem of deciding whether a defined domain atom
P (a¯) holds in the safely defined structure in a finite pars(∆)-structureO is in∆P2 . For
some∆, the problem is co-NP hard.
Proof. We first show containment in ∆P2 . By solving a polynomial number of co-
NP problems, we can compute the set of safely derivable atoms in any structure. By
doing this a polynomial number of times, we find the safely defined structure and can
determine if P (a¯) is true in it.
We now show co-NP-hardness. To do this, we encode the co-NP-hard problem of
deciding validity of a propositional formula ϕ in Disjunctive Normal Form (DNF). A
formula ϕ in DNF is a set of disjuncts, each of which is a conjunction of literals. We
encode ϕ over propositional vocabulary ξ as a context structureOϕ providing interpre-
tation for the following parameter predicates:
• domain ofOϕ = ξ∪ϕ: it contains all propositional symbols of ξ and all disjuncts
of ϕ.
• PropOϕ = ξ,
• DisOϕ = ϕ, the set of disjuncts of ϕ;
• PosOϕ = {(d, p) | p is a positive literal in a disjunct d ∈ ϕ};
• NegOϕ = {(d, p) | ¬p is a negative literal in a disjunct d ∈ ϕ}.
The size ofOϕ is linear in the size ofϕ. Furthermore, we introduce the predicate T/1 to
encode ξ-structures I . In particular, the value of T will be the set of true propositional
symbols in I . Consider the following definition:
∆ =
{
V al← ∃d(Dis(d) ∧ ∀p(Pos(d, p)⇒ T (p)) ∧ ∀p(Neg(d, p)⇒ ¬T (p)))
∀p(T (p)← V al ∧ Prop(p))
}
The definition defines V al/0 and T/1. It is straightforward to see that the definiens of
V al expresses the satisfaction of ϕ in the ξ-structure encoded by T/1.
We prove that V al is true in the safely defined structure in Oϕ if and only if the
encoded formula ϕ is valid.
First, if ϕ is false in ∅, then ϕ is not valid. In this case, the first element A0 = ∅ of
every natural induction encodes the empty ξ-structure in T , and we see that 〈A0〉 is the
uniqe natural induction. Hence, in this case, V al is false in the safely derived structure.
Otherwise ϕ is true in ∅. Then V al is derivable from A0 but not necessarily safely
derivable. In fact, V al is safely derivable exactly if ϕ is valid. Indeed, the natural
inductions of this definition are of the form
→ V al → T 1→ T 2→ . . .
where each Ti is a set of domain atoms of the form T (p). If ϕ is valid, then the definiens
of V al continues to hold at each stage. On the other hand, if ϕ is not valid, then there
exists a ξ-structure I in which ϕ is false. Then I is not empty since ϕ is true in ∅.
Consider the following two step natural induction:
→ V al → {T (p) | p ∈ I}
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This is a natural induction obtained by applying the second rule for each p ∈ I at the
second stage. In its limit, the definiens of V al is false and V al is not derivable. Hence,
the derivation of V al is not safe.
We conclude that the safely defined structure contains V al if and only if ϕ is valid.
Since deciding validity of a sentence in DNF is co-NP hard, we obtain the desired
result.
The complexity of computing the safely defined structure may be too high for prac-
tical computing. Here an important computational use of the induction order surfaces.
Given an induction order ≺, a defined domain atom A can be decided with a natural
induction in at most #{B | B ≺ A} + 1 steps. If rule application is computationally
feasible, then this may be an efficient method. Even better, the method may work also
in infinite structures. E.g. for Definition 1.2 of the satisfaction relation and its for-
malization∆|=, the context structuresO are infinite since they contain infinitely many
formulas. Yet, applying a rule is a constant time operation (given the satisfaction of
component formulas), and the complexity of deciding the defined domain atom “ϕ is
true in I”, is linear in #{ψ | ψ ≺|= ϕ}, the size of the formula.
Nevertheless, it would be nice to have an inductive construction method that does
not require an explicit induction order and that is more efficient (preferably tractable)
than computing safe natural inductions. If the polynomial hierarchy does not collapse,
it follows from the above theorem that such a method would not always compute
the safely defined structure. But perhaps it would be strong enough to compute the
defined set of definitions that occur in practice. In an earlier version of this work
(Denecker and Vennekens, 2014), we proposed an alternative construction, namely ul-
timate well-founded induction. However, this suffers from the same complexity prob-
lems. We conjecture, and intend to prove in future work, that standard well-founded
inductions (Denecker and Vennekens, 2007) provide such a construction: a tractable
induction process that is strong enough to compute the defined set of definitions that
occur in practice.
Summary: implications for informal definitions This section and the previous one
reveal some more properties of the considered types of informal definitions.
First, it confirmed what has been stated at the end of Section 3: that the role of the
induction order in an informal definition is to delay rule application till it is safe to do;
that safety ensures confluence; that the choice of the induction order does not matter as
long as it monotonically orders the definition.
Second, that natural inductions that respect a suitable induction order∝ follow this
order: larger atoms in the induction order are derived later.
Third, that in practical dealing with informal definitions, we often do not respect or
follow an induction order in the induction process. This is not needed as long as the
derivations that we make are safe. In this context, we have seen that a monotone rule
can be applied safely at all times.
Fourth, the properties of this type of definitions make it possible to perform many
computations in a cheap way, without computing the full induction process. By tweak-
ing the induction process in the right direction, we may efficiently decide membership
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of a defined fact. From a pragmatical point of view, this is certainly of crucial impor-
tance to reason on informal definitions.
Fifth, the defined set is a fixpoint of the induced operator, and in case of an ordered
definition, it is the unique fixpoint. In case of an iterated inductive definition, it is a
minimal fixpoint.
As said before, it seems that we often take these properties of informal definitions
for granted. The contribution here is that we are able to mathematically prove them in
a formal study, often for the first time.
The use of safe natural inductions to construct the defined set has some great po-
tential: they do not require knowledge of an induction order, and they are faster than
inductions that respect an induction order. From a knowledge representation perspec-
tive, the benefit is that in representing an informal definition, it suffices to represent the
rules; there is no need to express the induction order. From a computational perspec-
tive, it may be useful that safe inductions are much “faster” and derive defined atoms
with far less derivations.
On the other hand, it is clear as well that computing safe inductions could be aw-
fully difficult. Verifying that a factA is safely derivable in structureA seems to require
some form of unbounded “lookahead” to verify that it remains derivable in any natural
induction from A. We analyzed the finite case and showed that this check can be co-
NP hard. Computing natural inductions respecting a given induction order≺ might be
much cheaper, even in infinite structures.
While the induction order does not affect the defined set, it gives insight in the
definition, it shows how to set up the induction process towards a query, and provides us
with a test to verify the mathematical sensibility of the definition (see the next section).
Computationally, it may suggest an efficient method to compute defined facts. Thus
indeed, specifying the induction order is useful.
7 Beyond iterated definitions: white, black and differ-
ent shades of grey
The previous sections present a formal model of monotone, ordered and iterated def-
initions and define the notion of safely defined structure of a rule set ∆ in context O.
Most formal science theories are approximations of the studied reality and our theory is
no exception. There is a core area of informal definitions that the theory captures per-
fectly, but there are border cases as well. It is important to develop an understanding
of these border cases and how the theory behaves on them.
Sensible definitions beyond iterated definitions The informal semantics of rule sets
as definitions does not abruptly break beyond iterated definitions, as shown by the
following example.
Example 7.1. Let O be the natural number context structure of Example 3.11 and
∆ev1 the following variant definition of ∆ev that defines both Even and an auxiliary
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predicateNext:{
∀x∀y(Next(x, y)← x = y + 1)
∀x(Even(x) ← x = 0 ∨ ∃y(Next(x, y) ∧ ¬Even(y)))
}
This rule set faithfully expresses what to us seems an acceptable mathematical defi-
nition of the set of even numbers in the context of the natural numbers. The safely
defined model A of this definition in O is the intended one. Indeed, the following
natural induction is safe.
→ {Next(n, n+ 1) | n ∈ N} → Ev(0)→ Ev(2)→ . . .
Nevertheless, this rule set is not an ordered or iterated inductive definition in O
according to Definition 5.8. Indeed, in any dependency relation of ∆ev1, it holds that
Ev(n) ∝ Ev(m) for all n,m ∈ N. This follows from the fact that Ev(m) is derivable
in the structure {Next(m,n)} but not in {Next(m,n), Ev(n)}. However, as the same
two structures show, no such ∝ monotonically orders∆ev1 in O. N
By all means, the definition ∆ev1 is an innocent syntactic variation of ∆ev . It
was obtained by applying a general, useful technique: expliciting the definition of
an intermediate concept in a definition. The example shows that this operation may
easily break an iterated inductive definition. As such, the above example shows a
disturbing brittleness of the concept of a definition by iterated induction as defined in
Definition 3.46 that fortunately is not shared by the rule formalism under the semantics
of safely defined structures.
(Partially) paradoxical definitions Not every (informal or formal) rule set is a sound
mathematical definition. E.g., “we define a natural number to be Foo if it is not Foo”.
It is faithfully expressed as:
∆Foo =
{
∀x(Foo(x) ← ¬Foo(x))
}
Intuitively, this is a paradoxical definition: if some number is not Foo, then it is per
definition Foo, but if it is Foo, then it is per definition not Foo. On the other hand, the
safely defined set is well-defined in every context O: it is the empty set (the natural
induction 〈A0〉 is safe-terminal). Every domain atom is derivable in the safely defined
set but none is safely derivable. Hence, the safely defined set is not saturated, it is not
a fixpoint nor does it satisfy the implications of the definition.
Other rule sets do not have that paradoxical flavour of the Foo definition but never-
theless fail to define a set. E.g.,{
∀x(P (x)← ¬Q(x))
∀x(Q(x)← ¬P (x))
}
Also for this definition, the one step natural induction 〈A0〉 is safe-terminal and the
safely defined structure in every context is the empty structure. Every atom of P and
Q is derivable but none is safely derivable.
Some definitions are mathematically sound definitions in some contexts and not in
others. But in these other contexts, they still partially define a set.
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Example 7.2. In the context of the integer numbers Z, the evenness definition ∆ev is
not an ordered definition. It has a unique natural induction that is safe-terminal but not
terminal.
→ Ev(0)→ Ev(2)→ . . .
The safely defined set is the set of positive even numbers. Each atom Even(n) for
negative number n is derivable but none is safely derivable. The safely defined struc-
ture is not saturated, it is not a fixpoint and it does not satisfy the implications of the
definition. N
Some informal rule sets (in some context O) are not sound definitions according
to mathematical standards. It seems to us that such definitions would be considered as
mathematical errors and they should not be allowed to appear in reviewedmathematical
text. They may still partially define a set: some objects are soundly derived to be in the
set, others to be out the set, and some are undecided.
On the other hand, the safely defined structure is a mathematically well-defined
structure for every definition∆ in every context O. One clear indication of an error is
when the safely defined structure is not saturated. The derivable but not safely deriv-
able domain atoms are undecided elements of the defined set. Also atoms that are not
derivable but not strictly underivable are undecided elements of the defined set.
While such (partially) paradoxical definitions seem unacceptable in standard math-
ematical practice, certain definitional paradoxes and the partial sets they define have
attracted considerable attention in the philosophical logic community.
Theory of truth A longstanding problem in philosophical logic is the definition of a
truth predicate (Tarski, 1944; Kripke, 1975). The exposition below is based on (Fitting,
1997). Let Σ be the vocabulary of Peano arithmetic (possibly augmented with addi-
tional symbols), and O its standard interpretation (extended for the additional sym-
bols). Let T/1 be a new unary predicate and ΣT = Σ ∪ {T/1}. Assume there is
a Go¨del numbering ⌈·⌉ of formulas over ΣT which allows for paradoxes and other
self-referential statements such as liars “this sentence is false” and truth tellers “this
sentence is true”. The challenge is to define T as the set of all Go¨del numbers of true
propositions. Formally, its (infinite) definition∆Truth consists of, for each sentence ϕ
over ΣT , the rule
T (⌈ϕ⌉)← ϕ
This is a recursive definition since sentences ϕ are allowed to include the truth pred-
icate. A liar sentence has the form ¬T (nl) where nl = ⌈¬T (nl)⌉. For such a liar
sentence, the definition contains the rule:
T (nl)← ¬T (nl)
Thus, T (nl) is undefined in the defined structure of∆Truth. A truth teller has the form
T (nt) where nt = ⌈T (nt)⌉. For them,∆Truth contains rules of the form:
T (nt)← T (nt)
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Kripke proposed a three-valued construction that produces a partial set for T in which
liar and truth sayer sentences are left undefined, as well as many other self-referential
sentences.
We can see that in the safely defined structure of this definition, liars and truth
sayers are false. Liars are not safely derivable, nor strictly underivable, while truth
sayers are strictly underivable.
Not so sensible monotone, ordered, iterated definitions A key intuition that has
guided the research here is the idea that a rule can be applied only if it continues to
apply in every natural induction. The concept of safe natural induction formalizes this
by only deriving atomsA in structureA that remain derivable in every natural induction
fromA. However, this is not exactly the same. In the remainder of this section, we will
see examples of monotone, ordered, iterated definitions and safe natural inductions
where a rule is “safely applied”, and yet, the rule condition becomes violated at a later
stage.
Example 7.3. The rule set
{
P ← t
}
is a monotone, an ordered and an iterated
definition. The induction order is the empty order ≺∅. If we replace its rule body by a
tautology, these properties and the defined structure are preserved. (see Proposition 7.4
below). Hence, also {
P ← ¬P ∨ P
}
and, after splitting this rule: {
P ← ¬P
P ← P
}
are monotone, ordered and iterated definitions that define {P}. Notice that in the latter
rule, P depends on itself in each rule separately, yet globally it does not depend on
itself. The natural induction
→ P
derives P using the first rule. The condition of this rule is violated after application
of the rule. However, by then the second rule applies. Hence, this is a safe-terminal
natural induction. N
The correctness of the transformation in the above example follows from the propo-
sition below.
Proposition 7.4. Let ϕ, ϕ′ be logically equivalent. Substituting rule ∀x¯(P (t¯) ← ϕ′)
for a rule ∀x¯(P (t¯)← ϕ) in ∆ in some context O preserves (monotone) dependencies,
the property of being a monotone/ordered/iterated definition, (safe) natural inductions
and the defined set. The same holds for splitting a rule ∀x¯(P (t¯) ← ϕ ∨ ψ) in a pair
∀x¯(P (t¯)← ϕ), ∀x¯(P (t¯)← ψ).
Proof. The concepts of dependency, monotone dependency, and (safe) natural induc-
tion are defined semantically and hence, they are preserved under equivalence preserv-
ing transformations to rule bodies.
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It is questionable whether the behaviour displayed in the previous example is found
in informal definitions in mathematical text. At least, we have never seen this. It would
occur in the variant informal definition in the following example.
Example 7.5. Consider the variant of the informal definition of satisfaction (Defini-
tion 1.2) obtained in a similar way, by replacing its first rule by the following ones:
• I |= P if I 6|= P and P ∈ I;
• I |= P if I |= P and P ∈ I;
One could argue that these new rules “obviously” are equivalent to the original one by
appealing to the fact that “I |= ¬P or I 6|= ¬P ” is tautologically true. But the modified
rules intuitively mismatch the induction order and we doubt whether such a definition
would be accepted in mathematical text (we would not accept it, at least).
On the formal level, ∆|= is easily modified to express the above informal defini-
tion. It is an ordered definition in every suitable context O induced by a propositional
vocabulary ξ. For P ∈ I , any safe natural induction derives I |= P using the first rule,
after which its condition is violated but the second rule starts to apply. N
The same behaviour as in the previous case is found also in rule sets that are not
iterated definitions.
Example 7.6. The rule set below has the property that its safely defined structure is a
non-minimal fixpoint. 

Q← ¬P
Q← P ∧Q
P ← Q
P ← P


It is not an iterated definition : the unique dependency is the total relation on defined
atoms, and this does not monotonically order the definition. The unique terminal natu-
ral induction of this definition is:
→ Q→ P
Formally, it is safe. Indeed, initiallyQ is derived from its first rule. While its condition
¬P is later canceled, it is canceled only after the derivation of P , at which time Q
is derivable from its second rule. The defined set is a fixpoint. However, it is not a
minimal fixpoint. The least fixpoint is {P}. N
In all above cases, we found behavior that we probably never encounter in math-
ematics. This suggests that an implicit convention of informal definitions is not yet
explicit in our theory: our definitions of monotone, ordered and iterated definitions and
the concept of safe natural induction might be too liberal. Some convention regarding
informal definitions remains to be discovered.
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8 On the role of the induction order
The role of the induction order ≺ in an informal definition is to delay the application
of a (nonmonotone) rule until it is safe to do so, as explained above. This ensures that
all natural inductions that respect ≺ are confluent (if at least the induction order is a
dependency of the informal definition). But contrary to what might be expected, the
induction order has no semantical role: the set defined by a definition over an induction
order can be computed without knowing this order and hence, it does not depend on
the induction order.
Nevertheless, there is value in specifying an induction order for (informal) defini-
tions.
• An induction order gives the reader insight in the structure of the definition, and
the structure of its (safe or natural) induction processes. It helps the reader to
understand the definition.
• Given that it is not difficult to write senseless definitions, specifying an induction
order yields a “parity check” for verifying the mathematical sensibility of the
definition. Once the reader has verified that the induction order is a well-founded
order and dependency of the definition, she can be certain that the definiendum
is well-defined. One will “feel” this parity check in operation when reading the
following toy definition:
Definition 8.1. We define the set of grue natural numbers by induction on the
standard order:
– n is grue if n+ 1 is grue.
This is a monotone definition defining the set of grue numbers to be empty, but
the induction order does not match the inductive rule, and such a definition is
mathematically unacceptable.
• From a reasoning and computational point of view, a given induction order is a
tremendous help. It helps to build safe natural inductions without the expensive
“safety check”.
• It helps to tune an induction process to compute truth or falsity of a defined fact.
• The induction order gives us a criterion to stop a partial induction process and
still be certain that a queried fact cannot be derived anymore.
• The induction order is underlying all top-down computation procedures to com-
pute the truth value of a defined fact A. Such computations can be understood
as intertwined computations of the set {B | B ≺ A} and the computation of a
natural induction on this set towards A.
• In infinite spaces, terminal natural inductions are infinite objects, but if {B |
B ≺ A} is finite, the value of a defined fact A can be computed, and the size of
{B | B ≺ A} is an indicator of the computational complexity of this.
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Thus, although the induction order≺ (and by extension, an induction relation∝ for
iterated definitions) is semantically not useful and it may put a burden on the knowledge
representation, it might still be valuable to extend a definition logic to allow to express
the induction order. Such an explicit induction order could then be used by the system
for the various tasks that we discussed above.
9 Conclusion
This paper could be viewed as an empirical, formal, exact scientific study of certain
classes of informal definitions, in the following sense of these words: empirical: defi-
nitions exist, can be written, read, interpreted, reasoned upon; formal: a mathematical
model is built for them; exact: the formal model characterises the informal definitions
in detail.
For lecturers and authors of text books in mathematics and logic, the results of this
paper may in the long run prove useful to explain students the meaning of various types
of definitions that appear in their courses or text books.
To metamathematics, the paper makes a contribution of formalizing the induction
process in common forms of definitions. It led us to explore several fundamental
aspects that were not studied before. To recall the most important ones: the non-
determinism of the induction process, the role of the induction order and its link with
the rules, the confluence of induction processes, the independency of the defined set of
the induction order. We pointed to the pragmatical importance of these properties, e.g.,
the possibility of directing the induction process towards answering a specific query.
The independency of the induction order suggests to build a general rule-based def-
inition logic without induction order, using the semantics of safely defined structures.
Our exploration of this idea had a mixed outcome with on the positive side sensible
definitions beyond iterated definitions and the link with definitional paradoxes but on
the negative side the high complexity of the semantics in finite structures, a lack of dis-
tinction between atoms that are defined as false and that are undefined, and also some
counterintuitive examples with, e.g., non-minimal defined fixpoints. The paper is open-
ended on this level. We conjecture that methods of three-valued logic inspired by the
semantics of logic programming are useful to tackle at least some of these problems.
To knowledge representation, the paper contributes a study of an important form
of human knowledge available in virtually all KR applications, and supported in many
expressive declarative systems.
From the perspective of KR, an uncommon aspect of our study is its exact, formal
approach to the studied forms of knowledge. KR research aims to develop formal lan-
guages and methods to express knowledge, but it rarely pretends to be the scientific
study of knowledge. Knowledge 4 is a cognitive reality that many consider to be out
4The word “knowledge” is not he appropriate term here, but the right word does not seem to exist yet, or
at least, we do not know it. In philosophical logic, knowledge is often defined as “true justified belief”, and
this is certainly not what we have in mind. What we have in mind with is the “thing” that could be true or
false, believed or not believed, and if it is believed, could be believed in a justified way or in an unjustified
way. It could perhaps better be called “a piece of information”, or a “quantum of information”, a word used
in (Devlin, 1991) in a sense that is certainly close that what we had in mind.
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of reach of the methods of formal empirical scientific investigation. Moreover, human
knowledge is communicated in informal natural language which for many is inevitably
vague and ambiguous. It is true that natural language is sometimes ambiguous, but
there are other contexts where it can be extremely precise. In particular, mathemati-
cians and formal scientist are trained in precise language and they use informal natural
language to build their disciplines with mathematical precision. The definition is a part
of the informal language of formal science and mathematics. Its precision makes it an
ideal target for a formal ’empirical’ study. In this, we have stressed the mathematical
nature of the “experiments”. E.g., the question of whether an informal definition such
as Definition 1.2 is faithfully expressed by a formal definition such as∆|=, whether its
subformula order is formalized by≺|=, or whether the formally and informally defined
sets coincide: these facts are not matter of contention; they are mathematical facts.
A contribution that is not yet elaborated here is to logic programming. There
is an obvious syntactical link between definitions in this papers and logic programs.
Ever since the early days of logic programming when the negation as failure prob-
lem arose, some have explained the declarative meaning of logic programs in terms of
definitions. This holds especially for those that adopted the well-founded semantics
(Van Gelder et al., 1991). The link was made explicit in several publications (Schlipf,
1995a; Denecker, 1998; Denecker et al., 2001; Denecker and Ternovska, 2008), where
various arguments can be found that, under the well-founded semantics, each rule in a
set of rules can be seen as an (inductive or base) case of a (possibly inductive) defini-
tion. A problem with all these attempts has been the absence of a natural formal model
of the relevant sorts of informal definitions. Therefore, a weakness in all these stud-
ies is the absence of an obvious connection between how we understand various types
of informal inductive definitions in mathematical text and the complex mathematics of
the well-founded semantics. With the present paper, we believe to have closed this gap.
Now, we are on mathematical ground. We conjecture that for all mathematical defini-
tions that occur in practice, the set defined by a formal definition is the well-founded
model. It is part of our future research agenda to prove that this indeed holds.
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